Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

John Groberg and Shauna Groberg, Plaintiffs/
Appellants/Cross-Appellees vs. Housing
Opportunities, Inc., a Utah nonprofit corporation,
Margaret M. Dahle, John L. Krueger, and Granite
Credit Union, a Utah corporation, Defendants/
Appellees/Cross-Appellant : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan H. Booth; Kirton & McConkie; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Rodney Gilmore; J. Bruce Reading; Scalley & Reading; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., No. 20010754 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3461

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF I T.-Mi
JOHN GROBERG and SHAUNA
GROBERG.
Piaiim;IM

\; ;'•••'

ClW." Nn "'l HI l l f ^

(' \.

'

1

Civil No. 9909121S?
Third District Court. Salt Lake v. ounty

A pro! "'vs.
HOUSING OPPORTL'M 1iES, l.M... >-. :ah
i
nonprofit corporation, MARGARET M
DAHLE. JOHN L. KRUEGER. and
GRANITE CREO'T UNION, a Utah
• nmoration,

' •.

; wviLMl \ ; ANUPL^LiShLD
DECISION REQUESTED

Defendants/Appellees/CrossAppellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEL/('*nss \PPELI AN~ ? n r ~ I N G n ^ P O R T T T ^ r H T ; c
INC
ppeal from a 1 uial Order eY the 1 h;id Judicial District Court,
:• di\d for Salt Fake Countv, Judue Tvrone E. Medle\
Br\aii h. ^uuth (-':""-~ I ?
Kirton & MeConkk
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O.Box 45120
Salt Fake City, F tai> >4
.4 ttorney for PI lint- '
lopellees

J. Bruce Pleading (£2700)
Scalle\ & Reading, P C
261 East 300 South, Suite .•• •
Salt Lake City, Ctah 84111
Attorney for Defendant• Appellee/CrossAppellant Housing Opportunities, Inc.
udjits/ Cross-

Rodney Gilmore (^8425)
P ( ) Box

i'ri

Layton, FT 84041
Attorney for AppeIIee> \Ijn'.nrand John I Kmetier

M. Dahle

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN GROBERG and SHAUNA
GROBERG,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/CrossAppellants,

Case No. 20010754 CA

Civil No. 990912183
Third District Court, Salt Lake County

vs.
HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES, INC., a Utah ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED
nonprofit corporation, MARGARET M.
DECISION REQUESTED
DAHLE, JOHN L. KRUEGER, and
GRANITE CREDIT UNION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants/Appellees/CrossAppellees,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES,
INC.
Appeal from a Final Order of the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Bryan H. Booth (#7471)
Kirton & McConkie
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
A ttorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants/CrossAppellees
Rodney Gilmore (#8425)
P.O. Box 1971
Layton, UT 84041
A ttorney for Appellees Margaret M. Dahle
and John L. Krueger

J. Bruce Reading (#2700)
Scalley & Reading, P.C.
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
A ttorney for Defendant/Appellee/CrossAppellants Housing Opportunities, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANTS AND APPLICABLE
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE RAISED BY CROSS-APPELLANT HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES
INC. AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

A.

Nature of the Case

5

B.

Course of Proceedings

7

C.

Disposition of the Case

8

D.

Statement of Facts

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

14

ARGUMENT

16

I.

BECAUSE THE GROBERGS ALONE DECIDED TO PERFORM LABOR
ON LOT 13, AND BECAUSE THEY MADE IMPROVEMENTS OF THEIR
OWN CHOOSING, THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN
16
A.

Because the Grobergs Have Failed to Appeal the Trial Court's Finding
of Fact that HOI Did Not Request the Work, the Grobergs Are Not
Entitled to a Mechanic's Lien for Labor or Materials
19

i

B.

Because There Was No Express or Implied Contract for the Grobergs'
Labor, They Cannot Assert a Mechanic's Lien Against HOI
22
1.

2.

The REPC Did Not Expressly Require the Grobergs to Do
Their Own Labor

22

In Making Expensive Improvements of Their Own Choosing,
the Grobergs Went Well Beyond the "Rehabilitation" of the
House Required by the REPC, and Caused the Project to
Exceed the Budgetary Constraints of the McClelland Contract
24

3.

HOI Did Not Have an Implied Contract With the Grobergs 26

C.

The Cases Cited by the Grobergs in Support of Their Mechanic's Lien
Claim are Clearly Distinguishable From the Case at Bar
28

D.

Because the Grobergs Were Not Licensed Contractors at the Time
They Performed the Work, They are Statutorily Barred From Bringing
an Action Under Either the Mechanic's Lien Statute or Under An
Unjust Enrichment Cause of Action
32

BECAUSE THE GROBERGS NEVER TENDERED $138,000, AND
BECAUSE HOI NEVER AGREED TO SELL THE HOUSE ON LOT 13 TO
THE GROBERGS FOR $138,000, HOI DID NOT BREACH A CONTRACT
TO SELL THE PROPERTY FOR THAT PRICE
35
BECAUSE THE GROBERGS PROVIDED NO BENEFIT TO HOI, THEY
CANNOT RECOVER ON A CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT . . . 38
A.

The Grobergs Failed to Show That They Provided Any Benefit to HOI
38

B.

The Grobergs' Reliance on Jeffs v. StubbsIs Misplaced

C.

The Trial Court's Decision on the Unjust Enrichment Claim is
Entitled to Deference Due to the Trial Court's Ability to Observe
Non-Record Facts, and Due to the Complexity and Novelty of the
Facts Under Review
41

ii

40

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD HOI
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES FOR PREVAILING ON THE
GROBERGS' BREACH OF CONTRA r T AMD TTNTTTCT ENRTPTI- ... ,
CLAIMS
CONCLUSION
CERI •-1> ATE OF SERVICE
M'i»=

<

I ill

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 911 P.2d 518 (Utah Ct. App.
1999)
33, 38
A&MEnterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 482 P.2d 700 (Utah 1971)
Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

17, 19, 32
1,16,19, 22, 26, 28, 30-31

Barton Enterprises v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996)
Belnap v. Condon, 97 P. 111 (Utah 1908)

36-37
17, 18,19, 32

Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984)
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603 (Utah 1970)

36
26-28, 38, 39
19,28-30

Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
Dipoma v. Mcphie, 29 P.3d 1225 (Utah 2001)

42-43
36

Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300 (Utah 1977)

1, 17, 22, 26

Durant v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 17, 990 F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1993)

43

ELM, Inc. v. M. T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

20

FirstInv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683 (Utah 1980)

27, 39

Hargreaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262 (Utah 1922)

37

In Re Davidson Lumber, 164 B.R. 773 (D. Utah 1993)

30

Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982)

17, 22, 26

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998)

2, 40-42

iv

Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976)
Prows v. Hawley 271 P. 31 (1928)

42-44
36
29-30

SLW/Utah, L.C., v. Griffiths, 967 P. 2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d427 (1961)
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998)
Wadsworth Constr'n v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

24
1
36
3, 20
1

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3

4, 16

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18

4, 44

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301

32-33

Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604

4, 32-34

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56

10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5

4

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Ed. 2000

24

1 Joseph M. Perillo et al., Corbin on Contracts § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed. 1993)

36

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics' Liens 132

17

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal, as transferred from the Utah
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANTS
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the district court correctly found that HOI had not

requested the Grobergs' work and that the Grobergs were therefore not entitled to assert a
mechanic's lien against HOI.
Standard of Review: Entitlement to a mechanic's lien is a mixed question of law
and fact. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah Ct. App 1989) ("So long as it can
be found that the [contractor] performed the work at the instance of [the owner] under an
express or implied contract... the lien is valid. "Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah
1977). In determining whether a contract or implied contract exists, the trial court "first
finds the facts to which the law will be applied, and then it applies the law to those facts to
reach a conclusion of law." Wadsworth Constr'n v. City of St George, 865 P.2d 1373
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) {citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993)).
2.

Issue: Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Grobergs had

failed to demonstrate that HOI breached a contract for the sale of real property to the
Grobergs.
Standard of Review: The Grobergs correctly assert that the issue of whether a
contract has been breached is a matter of law, reviewed for correctness, insofar as the facts
1

regarding the conduct in question are undisputed; and that the underlying factual findings
upon which the court's legal conclusions are based should be reversed only if they are
clearly erroneous.
3.

Issue: Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Grobergs had

failed to fulfill the elements required to prevail on a contract implied in law.
Standard of Review: While the Grobergs correctly identify this issue as a mixed
question of law and fact, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[u]njust enrichment law
developed to remedy injustice when other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment
must remain a flexible and workable doctrine. Therefore, we afford broad discretion to the
trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970
P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998). Among the factors to be considered in favor of granting
broad discretion to the trial court in the application of law to fact are: (1) the level of
factual complexity; (2) the novelty of the factual situation; and (3) the trial judge's reliance
on non-record facts such as the demeanor of witnesses. See Id, at 1244.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE RAISED BY CROSS-APPELLANT HOUSING
OPPORTUNITIES. INC. AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Cross-Appellant Housing Opportunities, Inc. ("HOI") asserts the following issue on
cross-appeal:
Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that HOI was not
entitled to attorney fees, even though HOI was the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach
of contract, unjust enrichment, and mechanic's lien claims.
2

a.

Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315
(Utah 1998).
b.

Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by the Affidavit of

Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. at 304-312) filed by HOI's counsel. The Grobergs' counsel
filed an Objection to the Affidavit (R. at 332-39), and HOI's counsel filed a Reply to the
Grobergs' Objection (R. at 340-43). In their Objection to HOI's Affidavit of Attorney's
Fees and Costs, the Grobergs argued that HOI could not recover attorney fees for
successfully defending against the Grobergs' breach of contract or unjust enrichment
claims (R. at 335), and argued that HOI could only recover for successfully defending the
mechanic's lien claim. HOI's counsel filed a Reply to the Grobergs' Objection, and argued
that because the Grobergs' contract claim and unjust enrichment claim involved a common
core of facts and related legal theories, HOI was entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on
both claims (R. at 340-43). The District Court agreed with the Grobergs and concluded
that "HOI is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees for defending against the
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim and the Grobergs are entitled to recover reasonable
attorney's fees for defending against HOI's Counterclaim." (R. at 347.) The District Court
concluded that, because the attorney fees and costs to which each party was entitled was
substantially the same, no attorney fees should be awarded to either party. (R. at 348.)

3

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as
the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and
Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner
may have in the property.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any action in any court of
the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which a license
is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a properly
licensed contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into, and when the
alleged cause of action arose.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
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note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Nature of the Case
This case arose from a July, 1996 real estate purchase contract ("REPC") under
which HOI would purchase a house owned by the Grobergs (the "Groberg Property") for
$87,500, and the Grobergs would purchase a house from HOI for an unspecified price.
Under the REPC, HOI would provide the Grobergs with an existing house, which was to be
moved to Lot 13 of a subdivision under development by HOI. The Grobergs would then pay
for the rehabilitation of the house and pay for the associated costs using the equity they had
in the Groberg Property. If the costs exceeded their equity, HOI would assist the Grobergs
in obtaining a mortgage loan.
However, the Grobergs were given the option of keeping their original house if they
were not satisfied with their new property on Lot 13. In consideration for this option and
the assistance with obtaining a loan, the Grobergs were required to grant HOI a utility
easement over the Groberg Property. If the Grobergs exercised their option to keep their
original house, HOI's utility easements would remain on the Groberg Property. The REPC
specified that no closing would occur until the Grobergs had completed the rehabilitation
work on Lot 13.
Accordingly, an existing house was moved to Lot 13 and the Grobergs selected and
hired their own contractor, Matt McClellan, to perform the renovations. Because HOI had
5

not closed on the Groberg Property, the Grobergs needed financing to pay McClellan. HOI
obtained limited, but adequate financing for McClellan's work from the Housing Authority
of Salt Lake County, and began making progress payments as the work proceeded. The
specifications and price of the renovation were determined by the Grobergs and McClellan,
and memorialized in a Home Repair Contract. However, unbeknownst to HOI, the
Grobergs began to install custom features in the house which were more expensive than
those specified in the Home Repair Contract, causing renovation costs to exceed the
available financing. Because the Grobergs planned on living in the house on Lot 13, they
began paying for these custom features out of pocket and performing their own labor. HOI
had neither approved these custom features nor requested the Grobergs' labor.
After McClellan had completed approximately 82% of the work, the Grobergs
became dissatisfied with his work, fired him, and took over as general contractor on Lot 13.
The Grobergs continued to draw on the financing HOI had obtained for Lot 13. After
assuming control of Lot 13, they continued to install custom features in the house that
were not part of the McClellan contract. The Grobergs did not expect any compensation
from HOI for the custom work because they considered Lot 13 to be their own house and
they expected to enjoy the benefits of such work.
In November of 1998, HOI sent the Grobergs a letter, for the first time specifying
the price for Lot 13 would be based upon the appraised value of Lot 13 ($138,000) plus
additional development and administrative costs. The Grobergs did not respond to the
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letter, but continued to work on Lot 13. Approximately eleven months later, after
continued disagreement with HOI on the price, and after HOI paid to settle a mechanic's
lien claim by McClellan for $12,980, the Grobergs decided to exercise their option not to
purchase Lot 13, and surrendered the property to HOI. Disappointed with their inability to
enjoy the fruits of the labor they had volunteered on Lot 13, the Grobergs filed their own
mechanic's lien against Lot 13. They later sued HOI, hoping to foreclose on the property
and to recover for breach of contract or quantum meruit.
HOI subsequently determined that, after settling McClellan's mechanic's lien and
paying commission and closing costs, it had spent $176,735.28 on Lot 13. Because HOI
was eventually able to sell Lot 13 for only $149,000, HOI incurred a $27,735.28 loss on
the property.
B. Course of Proceedings
The Grobergs filed a notice of a mechanic's lien against Lot 13 in hopes of
recovering the value of their work. They subsequently brought suit against HOI for
foreclosure of the lien, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. (R. at 47-51.) HOI
answered the Grobergs' Complaint and Counterclaimed for Breach of Contract, alleging
that the Grobergs had added improvements exceeding 90% of the appraised value of Lot 13,
and that as a consequence, HOI lost $27,735.28 in the sale of Lot 13. (R. at 87-88.) In the
alternative, HOI alleged that the Grobergs had breached the covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing implied in the contract by overbuilding on Lot 13, and then refusing to purchase it
at cost. (R. at 88-89.)
Trial was held on April 11 and 12, 2001. Judge Tyrone E. Medley concluded that,
with the exception of the price for Lot 13, the REPC was an integrated contract. (R. at
318-319.) Judge Medley ultimately denied any relief to either party for all causes of
action asserted in either the Grobergs' Complaint or HOI's Counterclaim.
C. Disposition of the Case
Judge Medley found that the Grobergs' improvements to Lot 13 were "not
requested by HOI nor provided at the instance of HOI." (R. at 320.) He therefore
concluded that the Grobergs were not entitled to foreclose on the mechanic's lien.
With regard to the Grobergs' contract claim, he found that the parties had orally
agreed that the purchase price of Lot 13 would be the appraised value, determined to be
$138,000 after the house had been moved onto the lot. (R. at 320.) In the alternative, he
concluded that HOI's November 11, 1998 letter requiring an additional $40,000 in
development costs constituted an amendment to the REPC which was ratified by the
Grobergs' continued work on the premises. (Id) He therefore denied the Grobergs'
contract claim.
With regard to the Grobergs' claim for quantum meruit, Judge Medley held that the
Grobergs could not recover on either branch of the doctrine. First, because HOI had not
requested the Grobergs' work, and because HOI had not engaged in any misleading acts,
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HOFs retention of the benefits of the Grobergs' work was not inequitable. (R. at 321-22.).
The Grobergs thus could not prevail on a contract implied in law. (Id) Second, the
Grobergs could not prevail on a contract implied in fact because HOI had never requested
their work and because the Grobergs had no expectation of payment at the time they
performed the work. (R. at 322.)
In addition, Judge Medley denied HOFs breach of contract and related covenant of
good faith claim because "the evidence established that the Grobergs had no obligation to
repay HOI for excess renovation costs" and because HOI had not met the required burden
to show any breach of good faith or fair dealing. (R. at 322.)
After trial, counsel for HOI and counsel for the Grobergs both submitted affidavits
in support of awards for attorney fees and costs. HOFs counsel averred to have expended
$11,807.50 in defending against the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim, the breach of
contract claim, and the related unjust enrichment claim. (R. at 304.) However, the
Grobergs' counsel objected to this amount on the ground that HOFs counsel could only
recover attorney fees for defending against the mechanic's lien claim, and that there was no
statute or contract that provided for attorney fees to the prevailing party on either the
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim or their contract claim. (R. at 332.) In addition, the
Grobergs' counsel argued that various costs claimed by HOFs counsel were improper and
that HOFs billing rates were excessive. He concluded that HOFs counsel was therefore
only entitled to recover $2,857.63.
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Counsel for the Grobergs requested a total of $3,530.50 in attorney fees for
defending against HOI's counterclaims, and argued that they arose from the REPC, which
entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees. (R. at 282-297.) In the alternative, counsel
for the Grobergs argued that HOI's counterclaim was without merit and he was entitled to
recovery fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Apparently convinced by the arguments of the Grobergs5 counsel, Judge Medley
agreed that HOI's attorney could only claim attorney fees for defending against the
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim. (R. at 347.) Judge Medley concluded that because the
legitimate attorney's fees and costs recoverable by each party were substantially the same,
no award should be made to either party. (R. at 348.)
D. Statement of Facts
This case arose from a July, 1996 real estate purchase contract ("REPC") under
which HOI would purchase a house owned by the Grobergs (the "Groberg Property") for
$87,500. (See REPC, provided in the Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 23-26.) The
Grobergs would in turn move, rehabilitate, and purchase an existing house supplied by HOI
and to grant HOI a utility easement over the Groberg Property. (See Id. at 26.) The REPC
specified that no closing would occur until the Grobergs had completed the rehabilitation
work on the new property. (Id. at 25.) The house the Grobergs planned to purchase from
HOI was an existing house that would be moved to a subdivision under development by HOI.
(Id at 26 and R. 367, p. 39). [Note: both volumes of the Trial Transcript, R. 367-68
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will be hereinafter referred to as "Tr. "followed by the page number of the
transcript.] HOFs goal was to provide the Grobergs with a house equal to or better than
the Groberg Property for approximately the appraised value of the Groberg Property. (See
Exhibit A of the REPC, provided in the Groberg (Appellants') Addendum at 26.) Under the
REPC, if the Grobergs were at any time not satisfied with their new property, they could
back out of the contract and keep their original house. (See Id.) However, if the Grobergs
exercised this option, HOFs utility easements would remain on the Groberg Property. (Id.)
Under the REPC, the Grobergs' new house would be moved to Lot 13 of the HOI
subdivision (hereinafter, "Lot 13" or "the house on Lot 13"). (See Appellant's Groberg
(Appellant's) Addendum at 26.) HOI would credit the Grobergs' equity in the Groberg
Property toward the costs associated with Lot 13. (Id.) If the costs associated with Lot 13
exceeded the Grobergs' equity, HOI was required assist the Grobergs in obtaining
additional financing. (Id.)
The REPC did not specify the price for Lot 13 because the rehabilitation costs were
not known at the time the REPC was executed. (Tr. at 231; 248; 261-62.) The Grobergs
testified that they believed that the price of Lot 13 was $70,000. (Tr. at 44.) Scott
Lancelot, who testified for HOI, believed the price of Lot 13 would be determined, in part,
by its appraised value. (Tr. at 159-60.) However, Dick Welch, who negotiated the REPC
with the Grobergs, admitted at trial that he never told the Grobergs that they would pay the
appraised price. (Tr. at 326-27.) Nevertheless the REPC specified that HOI was obligated
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to assist the Grobergs in obtaining financing for the cost of the rehabilitation up to 90% of
the appraised value of Lot 13. {See Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum [REPC] at 26.)
Accordingly, an existing house was moved to Lot 13 in October of 1997. (Tr. at
67.) The Grobergs selected and hired their own contractor, Matt McClellan, to perform the
renovations. (Tr. at 120.) The specifications and price of the renovation were determined
by the Grobergs and McClellan, and memorialized in a Home Repair Contract. {See "Home
Repair Contract," provided in Cross-Appellant HOI's Addendum at 1-15, and introduced at
trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 21.) HOI was not a party to the Home Repair Contract. {See Id)
In order to pay McClellan, the Grobergs signed a promissory note in favor of the Housing
Authority of Salt Lake for $83,770, to be secured by Lot 13. {See Cross-Appellant HOI's
Addendum at 16 , introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 17.) The Housing Authority
thereafter payed McClellan in installments as McClellan's work proceeded, subject to the
Grobergs' approval of McClellan's work. (Tr. at 350.) In addition, unbeknownst to HOI,
the Grobergs decided to supply certain labor and materials of their own choosing to Lot 13,
which were not contemplated in the Home Repair Contract with McClellan. (Tr. at 124133; 141-49; 352-54; 460-61; 468-74.)
After McClellan had completed approximately 82% of the work, the Grobergs
became dissatisfied and fired him in December of 1998. (Tr. at 161.) At that point, the
Grobergs decided to finish the work on Lot 13 themselves. (Id.) However, the Grobergs
were not licensed contractors, nor were the various relatives who assisted them in their
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work. (Tr. at 168.) After taking over the work, the Grobergs continued to stray from the
McClellan Home Repair Contract specifications, and installed such improvements in Lot
13 as they alone decided, without making change orders as required by their agreement with
the Housing Authority. (See Tr. at 354; see also "Housing Authority Rehabilitation
Agreement With Owner atfflf1, 2 and 11, provided in Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at
17-18 and introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 20.) The Grobergs did not expect any
compensation from HOI for such extra labor and materials because they planned on
purchasing Lot 13 and retaining the benefits of their labor. (Tr. at 138; 150.)
In November of 1998, HOI sent the Grobergs a letter, for the first time specifying a
price for Lot 13 based upon the appraised value ($138,000) plus additional development
and administrative costs. (See Letter from Scott Lancelot to John Groberg, dated 11-1198, provided at Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at 19-21 and introduced at trial as
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.) The Grobergs did not respond to the letter, but continued to work on
Lot 13. (Tr. at 161.)
In October of 1999, hoping to close the transaction, HOI offered Lot 13 to the
Grobergs for approximately $156,000, based upon an estimate of the site development and
renovation costs HOI had incurred on Lot 13 as of that date. (See Letter from Scott
Lancelot to John Grobergs' attorney, Richard L. Tretheway, dated 10-4-99, provided in
Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at 22-24 and introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 29.)
Shortly thereafter, the Grobergs decided to exercise their option not to purchase Lot 13,
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and surrendered the property to HOI. (Tr. at 88.) HOI subsequently determined that it had
spent $176,735.28 (Tr. at 287) on Lot 13. This included settling a mechanic's lien for
$12,980 placed on the property by McCiellan. (Tr. at 269-71.) HOI was eventually able to
sell Lot 13 for only $149,000 (Tr. at 282). HOI thus incurred a $27,735.28 loss on the
property.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Because HOI did not request the Grobergs' labor on Lot 13, and because the
Grobergs made custom improvements of their own choosing on Lot 13 without HOI's
authorization, the trial court properly denied the foreclosure of their mechanic's lien.
Vendees in possession of real property who improve premises in their own way and
according to their own special desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such
improvements are not "at the instance o f the owner as required by the mechanic's lien
statute. Moreover, the trial court's finding that the Grobergs did not renovate Lot 13 at
HOI's request is fatal to the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim because the statute requires,
at minimum, a request for labor or materials. Because the Grobergs' have failed to marshal
the facts in support of the trial court's finding that HOI did not request the renovations, and
have failed or to show how this finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, the trial
court's decision should be affirmed.
Further, the Grobergs were not licensed contractors when the performed the work
on Lot 13. By statute, contractors cannot commence or maintain any cause of action for
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compensation for work they have performed while unlicensed. While the statute admits of
common law exceptions related to whether the public is adequately protected, none of the
common law exceptions to the statute apply in this case.
The trial court also correctly denied the Grobergs5 breach of contract claim. The
real estate purchase contract ("REPC") provided that if the Grobergs decided not to
purchase Lot 13, they would be returned to their former estate as to ownership of
properties and debt, with the exception of the easements that the Grobergs had granted to
HOI. HOI fulfilled this agreement and returned the Grobergs to their former status. The
Grobergs now claim that HOI breached a contract to sell them Lot 13 for $138,000,
although they never contended at trial that such price had been agreed upon. Assuming
there was such a contract, nothing in the record shows that the Grobergs ever tendered
$138,000 to HOI for Lot 13. HOI thus committed no breach. In the alternative, the
reviewing Court can find that the record does not support the notion that the Grobergs and
HOI ever agreed to a $138,000 price. If there was no meeting of minds on the price, there
could be no breach of contract for a $138,000 sales price.
Because the Grobergs failed to demonstrate that their labor benefitted HOI, the trial
court's decision that HOI was not unjustly enriched should be affirmed. Rather than
realizing a benefit from the Grobergs' improvements, HOI lost over $27,000 on Lot 13.
The Grobergs installed custom improvements of their own choosing in Lot 13, resulting in
an over-improvement Lot 13 in relation to other houses in the low income subdivision
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where it was located. As a result, HOI could not realize the full value of the Grobergs'
improvements upon the sale of the house.
Finally, the trial court erred in denying HOI attorney fees for its successful defense
of the Grobergs' breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. The breach of contract
claim arose from the REPC, which provides for reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party. HOI was therefore entitled to attorney fees for defending that claim. In addition, the
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim arose from the same nucleus of material fact that served
as the basis for their mechanic's lien claim. Because the trial court held that HOI was
entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on the mechanic's lien claim, it should have also
found HOI entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending the factually and
theoretically overlapping unjust enrichment claim.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THE GROBERGS ALONE DECIDED TO PERFORM
LABOR ON LOT 13. AND BECAUSE THEY MADE
IMPROVEMENTS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. THEY ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN

A person who performs labor, or supplies materials used in the construction of
premises, can only assert a mechanic's lien for such labor or materials if they were
supplied "at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as
agent, contractor, or otherwise . . . ." 5eeUtah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added).
Utah courts have consistently held that, for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute, "at the
instance o f the owner means an express or implied contract with the owner. Bailey v. Call
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767 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1989) {citing Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977));
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). However, a
vendee in possession who improves premises in his own way and according to his own
needs and desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such improvements are not "at
the instance o f the owner. See A&M Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 482 P.2d 700 (Utah
\91\);Belnap v. Condon, 97 P. I l l (Utah 1908).
In A&M, Barrett, the owner of a ski lift, entered into an option contract with
Western Lift and Crane Corporation ("Western") for the sale of the lift. Western took
possession of the lift, and requested maintenance and repair work by plaintiff A&M. After
A&M did the work, Western was unable to make the payments necessary to exercise its
option, and did not pay A&M for its work. A&M thereafter attempted to foreclose on a
lien against Barrett under the mechanic's lien statute.
The A&M court held that the purchaser of property under an executory contract has
the status of a tenant, and as such cannot subject the property owner to a mechanic's lien
unless the purchaser has acted as the owner's agent in requesting the work. See A&M, 482
P.2d at 700. The A&M court observed that the purchaser of the lift "made such
improvements as it and it alone decided. Barrett had nothing to do with any work
contracted for." See A&M, 482 P.2d at 701. "Knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the
making of improvements by the tenant, are insufficient to establish agency." Id at 702
{citing 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics' Liens 132).
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The Utah Supreme Court also denied a mechanic's lien under similar circumstances
in Belnap. In that case, Lizzie Condon entered into an executory contract for the sale of
real property to the Beckers. The Beckers agreed to make interest payments to Condon for
five years, after which time the full purchase price was due. After the contract was signed,
Belnap supplied lumber to the Beckers, who made improvements on the property.
However, the Beckers never purchased the property from Condon. When Belnap
discovered that Condon was the owner of the property, he filed a mechanic's lien against
Condon.
In denying Belnap's lien, the Court held that "the person who can bind the owner's
land for the things for which a lien is given must in some way obtain his authority to do so
from the owner. Without such authority, express or implied . . . the owner's property is not
bound, although the improvements may benefit his land." Belnap, 97 P. at 113. Although
Condon had a strong expectation that the Beckers would build a dwelling on the property,
the Court noted that the written contract of sale did not require the Beckers to make
improvements, and distinguished the case from those cited by Belnap's counsel, all of
which involved contracts that required lessees or vendees to make "certain stipulated
improvements" Belnap, 97 P. at 114 (emphasis added). The Court explained that "when
one purchases land of any kind, he has at least the implied power to improve it in his own
way. If he does so upon his own responsibility, it is not easy to perceive how, in the
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absence of an express statute, he thereby binds the owner of the title for the value of the
improvements." Id.
Like the purchase contracts in A&Mmd in Belnap, the Grobergs5 REPC with HOI
did not require the Grobergs themselves to make any specific improvements on the
property in question. The REPC did not even require the Grobergs to perform their own
labor or to directly provide any materials. Rather, the Grobergs chose to perform their own
labor and to provide materials at their own expense because they believed they were
improving their own house, and planned to retain the benefits. Further, the Grobergs made
such improvements as they alone chose on Lot 13. None of the specific improvements
they made were requested or suggested by HOI. Finally, the bulk of the improvements they
made went well beyond the basic rehabilitation specified in the REPC, and caused the costs
of the construction to exceed the price for which the Grobergs5 own contractor had agreed
to do the work.
A.

Because the Grobergs Have Failed to Appeal the Trial Court's
Finding of Fact that HOI Did Not Request the Work, the Grobergs
Are Not Entitled to a Mechanic's Lien for Labor or Materials

There is no entitlement to a mechanic's lien unless the owner requested the
claimant's labor or materials, or an agent of the owner requested such labor or materials.
See Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603 (Utah 1970) (holding owner who orally requested
subcontractor to perform work outside his contract with the primary contractor was liable
for mechanic's lien); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding owner
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who directly contracted with first supplier was found liable for lien by secondary supplier
because first supplier had apparent authority to act for owner in requesting secondary
supplier's materials).
In the case at bar, the trial court made findings of fact that were fatal to the
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim. First, it found that "the Grobergs had substantial control
as to the construction that was pursued and the costs associated with the renovation." (R. at
317, f 26.) Second, it found that "HOI did not request that the renovation work be done on
the house on Lot 13." (R. at 318, % 27.)
Because these factual findings contradict the notion that the Grobergs provided
labor and materials "at the instance" or request HOI, and because the Grobergs have failed
to appeal these findings, their mechanic's lien claim must fail. "To successfully challenge
a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, '[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus
making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998)
(citations omitted).
To fulfill the marshaling requirement, an appellant must first present all the evidence
that supports the trial court's finding, and then show that despite this evidence, the trial
court's finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence. See
ELM, Inc. v. M. T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the
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Grobergs have not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings, which are amply supported by the record.
The Grobergs were not required to physically perform any labor on, or to supply any
materials directly to Lot 13. (Tr. at 122.) In fact, the original understanding was that
McClellan and other contractors would perform all the work, and that such work would be
funded by the equity the Grobergs had in their existing home and by additional loans, if
necessary. (See Tr. at 122 and Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 26, ^ 3 (Exhibit "A" of
the REPC)).
Further, testimony at trial showed that the Grobergs chose to work on Lot 13 for
numerous reasons, none of which were the result of a request by HOI. John Groberg
testified that he did the work because McClellan did not perform up to his expectations.
(Tr. at 80-81.) He put in some stairs because stairs installed by McClellan did not pass
code. (Tr. at 115-16.) He put in an air duct on the advice of a "furnace guy." (Tr. at 114.)
He alone chose to install tile rather than the vinyl floors specified in the McClellan
contract, in the absence or any request or authorization by HOI. (Tr. at 126-27.) While
John Groberg claimed he had HOI's permission to install tile rather than vinyl flooring (Tr.
at 126-27), this testimony was contradicted by Dick Welch (Tr. at 352-53) and John
Grobergs' own admission that he never obtained change order approval as required by HOI.
(Tr. at 164.) Rather than working "at the instance o f HOI, the Grobergs' did the work
because they "were willing to do the work to make it nice." (Tr. at 118.)
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Furthermore, John Groberg repeatedly testified that he did not expect compensation
for the work because he was working on his own house and the expectation was that he
would benefit himself by doing the work. (Tr. at 133, 138, 149, 150.) By his own
admission, he installed "extras" without first requesting change orders to determine
whether they were within the limits of the financing provided by HOI. (Tr. at 164.)
Without this authorization to perform the extra work, it is difficult to see how HOI
authorized or even suggested the Grobergs' work. The trial court thus reasonably
concluded that HOI did not request the work done by the Grobergs, and that the Grobergs
had substantial control of the work they performed.
B.

Because There Was No Express or Implied Contract for the
Grobergs' Labor. They Cannot Assert a Mechanic's Lien Against
HOI

For purposes of the mechanic's lien statute, "at the instance of" the owner means an
express or implied contract with the owner. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah 1989)
{citingDugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977)); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v.
Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). However, in the case at bar, there was neither
an express nor implied contract with HOI for the Grobergs' work.
1.

The REPC Did Not Expressly Require the Grobergs to Do
Their Own Labor

Although the Grobergs argue that the REPC obligated them to perform labor and
supply materials, an analysis of the REPC and the surrounding circumstances show that this
is not so. The REPC states that "[t]he Grobergs will move a house and rehabilitate the
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house utilizing the escrow fund." (See?\tfs. Ex. 10, provided in Groberg (Appellants')
Addendum, at 26.) However, nothing in this language requires the Grobergs, themselves, to
perform the physical labor or to provide materials. The REPC did not prohibit them from
delegating the work to contractors. In fact, the work was delegated to the Grobergs' own
contractor, McClellan, who performed approximately 82% of the work on Lot 13. (Tr. at
455.)
Moreover, ample evidence was presented at trial to show that neither the Grobergs
nor HOI, at the time of the July 1996 REPC, expected the Grobergs to perform any of their
own labor. For example, John Groberg testified that, due to back surgery he had undergone
prior to entering the REPC, he could not perform his own labor, and that Dick Welch was
aware of this at the time the REPC was negotiated. (Tr. at 37.) That the Grobergs were not
required to perform any labor or supply materials under the REPC was also made plainly
evident at trial in the following colloquy between John Groberg by HOI's counsel:
Q

Okay. But pursuant to this contract [i.e., the Grobergs' rehabilitation
contract for Lot 13 with McClellan] all the things contained within
this contract, isn't it true that you believed then that Mr. McClelland
[sic] was going to do everything in this document, you were to do
nothing?

A

That was the way I understood it.

(Tr. at 122, explanatory material added in brackets.)
John Groberg selected and hired McClellan as the general contractor for the
rehabilitation work despite HOI's recommendation of other contractors (Tr. at 120), and
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John Groberg alone made the decision to fire McClellan (Tr. at 82 and 161). Furthermore,
HOI was not a party to the Grobergs' contract with McClellan (seePltfs. Ex. 21, "Home
Repair Contract" provided in Cross-Appellant HOI's Addendum at 1). Instead, the
Grobergs had "full control of the rehabilitation process on that house" ( see testimony of
Dean Maltsberger, Tr. at 282). Finally, HOI never insisted that the Grobergs fire
McClellan or that the Grobergs take over as general contractor on Lot 13. (Tr. at 455-56.)
The Grobergs did these things on their own initiative.
2.

In Making Expensive Improvements of Their Own Choosing,
the Grobergs Went Well Beyond the "Rehabilitation" of the
House Required by the REPC. and Caused the Project to
Exceed the Budgetary Constraints of the McClellan Contract

The REPC only required the Grobergs (or their agents) to "rehabilitate" the house
on Lot 13. See Addendum to the Groberg Brief at 26. In interpreting a contract, the
meaning of its terms are often best determined through the use of stamdard, non-legal
dictionaries. SeeSLW/Utah, L.C., v. Griffiths, 967 P. 2d 534 at 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
"Rehabilitate" means to "restore to good condition, operation, or capacity." American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Ed. 2000.
The record shows that most of the work or materials for which the Grobergs seek
compensation went well beyond mere "rehabilitation" of the house. Moreover, the
Grobergs' work was largely outside the specifications of their contract with McClellan,
which was financed by a $70,111.00 loan HOI had obtained for the Grobergs. Thus, as a
result of their own decisions, the Grobergs' expenses exceeded the anticipated expenses of
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the McClellan contract and their existing loan. Rather than requiring McClellan to finish
his work (and thus keeping costs within the range of the McClellan bid) the Grobergs
instead decided to fire him and take over the work. This led not only to a duplication of
charges for the labor and materials that McClellan had bid a fixed price for (Tr. at 270-71),
but also to expensive changes of the Grobergs' own choosing. None of these changes were
authorized or even suggested by HOI.
During the cross examination of John Groberg, counsel for HOI demonstrated that
well over half the materials for which the Grobergs sought compensation were "extras" not
contemplated in the McClellan contract. Of the $10,179.39 in materials claimed by the
Grobergs, $6,822.52 were shown to be outside the Grobergs' contract with McClellan.
See items 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 19, 26, 29, 29, 37, 51, and 65 of the Grobergs' "Expense List"
(Pltfs. Ex. 39, provided in Cross-Apellant HOI's Addendum at 25-29) and compare with the
trial testimony of John Groberg, Tr. at 139-50).
The Grobergs' Expense List contained, among other things, charges for the
following items that were neither within the scope of the McClellan contract nor requested
by HOI: $1,125 for extra gutters (items #1 and # 37); $1,000 for coaxial cables; $1,500
for the construction of a garage storage room; $1,140.81 for materials to upgrade a gas
burning fireplace to wood burning (items # 9 and # 12); multiple charges for tile supplies;
$240 for beam wrap; and $1,650 for a master walk-in closet and counter with shelves and
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drawers. All these items were shown, on the cross examination of John Groberg, to be
outside the McClellan contract. (Tr. at 139-150.)
Moreover, the items mentioned above were supplied by the Grobergs without any
request by, or approval from, HOI. Dick Welch, Program Director for HOI, testified that
the Grobergs had no authority to exceed their budget with McClellan, and that change
orders were required if the Grobergs wished to make any changes to the specifications of
the McClellan contract. (Tr. at 352.) Nevertheless, the Grobergs made numerous changes
without ever requesting a change order. (Tr. at 354.) These changes included, according to
Welch, 68 hours of quarry tile work by the Grobergs (SeeTr. at 352 and Groberg
(Appellant's) Addendum at 68) and the construction of a garage storage room (Tr. at 353).
3.

HOI Did Not Have an Implied Contract With the Grobergs

While the issue of whether the Grobergs are entitled to recover on an implied
contract theory is more fully addressed in Part III of this Memorandum, below, the issue
also deserves treatment at this point to establish that the Grobergs were not entitled to their
mechanic's lien. See Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138 (Utah 1989) (citingDugger v. Cox, 564
P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977)); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386
(Utah 1982) (holding mechanic's lien requirement that the work be done "at the instance of
the owner" means there is either an express or implied contract with owner).
There are two branches of quantum meruit (also known as "implied contracts"):
contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1987). The Grobergs have not appealed the trial court's conclusion that there was
no contract implied in fact. (R. at 322.)
The Grobergs have, however, appealed the trial court's conclusion that there was no
contract implied in law (also known as "unjust enrichment"). The elements of a unjust
enrichment are: (1) the defendant has received a benefit; (2) the defendant appreciates the
benefit; and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
without paying for it. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269.
In Davies, the court noted that the measure of recovery for unjust enrichment "is
the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the
detriment incurred by the plaintiff... or necessarily the reasonable value of plaintiff s
services." Id. at 269 (citingFirstInv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)).
Because HOI gained nothing from the Grobergs' labor, HOI was not unjustly
enriched by the Grobergs. Rather than showing that HOI received a benefit, the
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that HOI actually lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13. As a
result, the Grobergs are not entitled to recover for unjust enrichment. This was shown on
direct examination of Scott Lancelot, when counsel for HOI introduced Defendant's
Exhibit 11 into evidence, showing a complete breakdown of the costs expended by HOI on
Lot 13. (SeeR. at 373 and Cross-Appellant's Addendum at 30-33.) According to
Defendant's Exhibit 11, which was received without objection, HOI expended $176,735.28
on Lot 13. However, HOI was only able to sell Lot 13 for $149,000.00.
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Under Davies, the detriment to the plaintiff does not determine his entitlement to
recovery. Rather, it is the benefit to the defendant that is relevant. Even assuming that the
Grobergs have accurately stated the reasonable value of their work as $16,808.72, HOI's
losses exceeded the Grobergs' by over $10,000. (See Plaintiff s Exhibits 39 [claiming
$10,861.22 in materials and utilities] and 46 [claiming $5,947.50 in labor] for a total of
$16,808.72.) It is thus impossible that the Grobergs provided any benefit to HOI.
C.

The Cases Cited by the Grobergs In Support of Their Mechanic's
Lien Claim Are Clearly Distinguishable From the Case at Bar

The Grobergs cite Davis v. Barrett, 461 P.2d 603 (Utah 1970) for the proposition
that the word "instance," as used in the mechanic's lien statute denotes "'impelling motive,
influence, or cause; at the solicitation or suggestion of." They also cite to Bailey v. Call,
767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) for the proposition that the owner consent requirement
of the statute is fulfilled by mere "authority to commence work on improvements."
However, these quotations are taken out of context and without reference to the
underlying facts of Davis or Bailey. The language cited in Davis was quoted from a nonmechanic's lien case, and such language has never been cited or relied upon by another state
court decision regarding mechanic's liens. Even more importantly, both cases are clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar, and involved significantly contrasting factual and
policy considerations.
In Davis, the owner of the property, Barrett, entered into a primary building contract
for the construction of a supermarket with Peterson. Under the contract, Peterson was
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responsible for providing a finished, "turn-key" product. Peterson subcontracted out the
wiring to Davis. During construction, Davis informed Barrett that Davis's contract with
Peterson did not require Davis to wire certain refrigeration units that were necessary to
finish the job, and that he would not do the work without an adjustment in his pay. Barrett
"instructed Davis to go ahead and do the wiring in order to get the store open" and promised
to compensate Davis for the extra work through a deduction in Peterson's pay. Davis, 467
P.2d at 604. When Davis was not fully paid for his work, he filed a mechanic's lien.
In holding that Davis was entitled to a mechanic's lien, the Davis court held that it
was immaterial whether Barrett had agreed to pay for the work. Davis, 467 P.2d at 605.
The relevant consideration was whether Barrett had instructed'Davis do the extra wiring.
Because there was no doubt that Barrett had instructed Davis to do so, the mechanic's lien
was valid.
Thus, the Davis court's quotation of Prows v. Hawley, 271 P. 31, 35 (1928)
("'instance' denotes an impelling motive, influence, or cause; at the solicitation or
suggestion of) was not necessary to justify a decision in favor of Davis. Barrett had
actually requested that Davis perform the specific job upon which the lien was based.
Moreover, the Prows case did not even involve a mechanic's lien. The Prows court was
interpreting language found in a complaint against the members of a partnership for the
breach of a contract for the sale of horse feed.
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Significantly, no other published decision has ever cited Prows to justify such an
overbroad interpretation of Utah's mechanic's lien statute. Indeed, Davis itself has only
been cited once in a published opinion, and the broad Prows definition of "at the instance
o f is neither mentioned or paraphrased in that decision. See In Re Davidson Lumber, 164
B.R. 773, 776 (D. Utah 1993). Thus, Davis9 excessively broad interpretation of the
mechanic's lien statute is an aberration, and has not been considered definitive by other
courts.
Turning to the case at bar, there is nothing in the record remotely parallel to the
facts of Davis. While Barrett specifically instructed Davis to do extra wiring outside his
contract, there is simply no evidence that HOI specifically instructed or guided the
Grobergs in making any specific improvements to Lot 13.
Nor do the facts of Bailey, upon which the Grobergs rely, bear any resemblance to
the facts of the case at bar. In Bailey, the owner of a furniture store, Call, decided to repair
the store's roof. Call contracted with Gurule for materials to be incorporated into the
work. Under the contract, Gurule was to supply the materials from his own stock at a
substantial discount. However, instead of supplying the materials himself, Gurule ordered
the materials on open account from Bailey, incurring substantially higher costs than he had
agreed to charge Call. When Gurule did not pay Bailey, Bailey placed a mechanic's lien on
Call's store.
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The trial court held that Gurule had exceeded his authority in ordering the materials
from Bailey, and held that Bailey was therefore not entitled to his lien. In reversing, the
Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work are an ineffective defense
against a mechanic's lien." Bailey, 767 P.2d at 141 (emphasis added). In other words, once
an agency relationship was established between Call and Gurule, Gurule had authorization
to enter contracts with third parties to supply materials. Call could not defeat Bailey's lien
by claiming that Gurule had exceeded his authority because Bailey had no notice of the
price limitations that Call had specified in his contract with Gurule. All that was required
for a valid lien was a showing that Gurule had authority to commence work as Call's agent.
Thus, the Bailey court's holding that the owner consent required by the mechanic's lien
statute is "merely authority to commence work on improvements" referred to an agency
relation between the primary contractor and the owner. See Bailey, 767 P.2d at 141-42.
Thus, once the agency relation is established, anything the contractor-agent causes a third
party to do in furtherance of the original contract can be the basis of a mechanic's lien.
In contrast, the issue presented by the case at bar does not involve the complication
of owner-contractor agency and the agent's contract with a third party. The Grobergs were
aware of the specifications in the McClelland contract which HOI had funded. They were
further aware that any "extras" beyond standard rehabilitation that they added to the house
would increase the cost of the house. There were no "secret limitations as to the price or
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nature of the work" that would result in unfairness to them due to their unawareness of such
limitations.
The facts under consideration in the case at bar are closer to those found in See
A&M Enterprises and Belnap, described in Part I, above. Those cases hold that a vendee in
possession who improves premises in his own way and according to his own needs and
desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such improvements are not "at the instance
o f the owner.
D.

Because the Grobergs Were Not Licensed Contractors at the Time
They Performed the Work. They Are Statutorily Barred From
Bringing an Action Under Either the Mechanic's Lien Statute or
Under An Unjust Enrichment Cause of Action

The Grobergs are barred by statute from bringing any action for compensation for
their labor on Lot 13. Utah Code Ann„ § 58-55-604 provides that:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any action in any
court of the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for
which a license is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that
he was a properly licensed contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into, and when the alleged cause of action arose.
Among the licenses required by Chapter 55 are licences for general building
contractors and residential contractors. 5eeUtah Code Ann. § 58-55-301. However when
asked at trial whether he or any of his family or friends who had provided the labor that was
the subject of this suit had construction trades licensing, John Groberg replied "probably
not." (Tr. at 168.)
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The Utah Court of Appeals has held that § 58-55-604 serves the purpose of
protecting the public from incompetent contractors and provides a sanction to contractors
who fail to obtain a license. A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen
Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). As such, the statutory bar to
recovery can only be overcome by four specific, common law exceptions. See Id. at
523-24. This is so regardless of whether recovery is sought under the mechanic's lien
statute or under equitable theories of relief. See Id. at 524.
In A.K.&R. Whipple, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of
HVAC subcontractor Whipple's mechanic's lien against Aspen on the ground that Whipple
was not licensed. However, the trial court's decision to allow Whipple to recover on
alternative principles of equity was reversed. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977 P.2d at 524. The
Whipple Court held that at least one of four established common law exceptions to § 5855-301 must apply to overcome the statute's bar to recovery, and that this is so whether
recovery is sought under the mechanic's lien statute or under an equitable theory such as
quantum meruit. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977P.2dat 522.
First, the statute may be overcome if the work is done for a party who possesses
skill and expertise in the field. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977 P.2d at 523. Second, the statute
may be overcome if the unlicensed contractor was supervised by a licensed contractor. See
Id. Third, if the reason the contractor fails to obtain a license is minor, and does not
undermine his ability to perform the work, the contractor may recover. See Id. Finally,
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whether the party requesting the work relied on the unlicensed contractor's representation
that he was licensed or whether the contractor has posted a performance bond are relevant
factors to consider in deciding whether the statute applies.
In the case at bar, the Grobergs were working for themselves, and the house on Lot
13 was eventually sold to a member of the public at large, Appellees Margaret Dahle and
John Krueger. (R. at 318.) Therefore, because it cannot be said that the house was being
built for someone with expertise in the field, the first exception does not apply.
The second common law exception does not apply because nothing in the record
indicates that the Grobergs' labor was supervised by a licensed contractor. Nor does the
third exception: the Grobergs' failure to be licensed was not due to a lapsed license, and
nothing in the record shows that the Grobergs believed they were covered by another
person's license.
Finally, while nothing in the record indicates that the Grobergs held themselves out
to the public as contractors, there is no evidence in the record that they posted a
performance bond for the completion of the rehabilitation of the house on Lot 13, as would
be required under the fourth common law exception. Therefore, the Grobergs cannot meet
any of the common law exceptions to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604. Because they were not
licensed contractors at the time they performed the work for which they are requesting
recovery, they are not entitled to recovery under either the mechanic's lien statute or any
equitable theory of recovery.
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n.

BECAUSE THE GROBERGS NEVER TENDERED $138,000. AND
BECAUSE HOI NEVER AGREED TO SELL THE HOUSE ON LOT
13 TO THE GROBERGS FOR $138.000. HOI DID NOT BREACH A
CONTRACT TO SELL THE PROPERTY FOR THAT PRICE

The trial court correctly denied the Grobergs' breach of contract claim. The real
estate purchase contract ("REPC") provided that if the Grobergs decided not to purchase
Lot 13, they would be returned to their former estate as to ownership of properties and
debt, with the exception of the easements that the Grobergs had granted to HOI. See
Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 26 (Exhibit A of the REPC). HOI fulfilled this
agreement and returned the Grobergs to their former status. The Grobergs now claim that
HOI breached a contract to sell them Lot 13 for $138,000, although they never made any
such contention at trial.
Assuming there was a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000, nothing in the record
shows that the Grobergs ever tendered $138,000 to HOI. It cannot therefore be said that
HOI breached a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000. When asked by the Grobergs'
counsel if HOI would have sold Lot 13 to the Grobergs for $138,000 in November of 1998
Scott Lancelot stated:
Yeah. At this point. . . if they had represented to us . . . on September
30th that they thought they would be done and be able to close within
30 days and certainly by the end of the year and . . . we could have sold
them this for 138,000
(Tr. at 266.)
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In the alternative, the reviewing Court can find that the record does not support the
notion that the Grobergs and HOI ever agreed to a $138,000 price. If there was no meeting
of minds on the price, there could be no breach of contract for a $138,000 sales price. On
appeal, the trial court's decision may be affirmed on any proper ground or theory apparent
from the record, even if it does so upon a ground that differs from the one the trial court
has relied upon. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley, 611 V2&U20, 1123 (Utah
1984) (affirming trial court's decision on alternate ground of purchase money resulting
trust, although trial court decision was grounded upon finding of fraudulent conveyance);
Dipoma v. Mcphie, 29 P.3d 1225, 1230 (Utah 2001) (affirming dismissal of case for
failure to pay filing fee, but on grounds of lack of timeliness rather than on jurisdictional
grounds). This holds true even if such ground or theory was not raised in the lower court,
and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. See Id.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals can affirm the trial court's decision that HOI
did not breach the REPC with the Grobergs by finding that there was no contract to sell Lot
13 for $138,000. In Barton Enterprises v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996) the court
declared:
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. SeePingree v.
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Valcarce
v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961). An agreement cannot be
enforced if its terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there was no intent to
contract. Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428; 1 Joseph M. Perillo et al., Corbin on
Contracts § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed. 1993).
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Barton, 928 P.2d at 373 (finding no agreement to abate rent on account of lessor's failure
to repair elevator in commercial lease). For an agreement on price to exist, the parties
must have a distinct intention common to both, such that they assent to "the same thing in
the same sense." Hargreaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262, 266 (Utah 1922) (finding no
agreement on the purchase price for real property where plaintiff, defendant, and the trial
court all had different opinions on the agreed-upon amount).
It is plainly evident from the record that the Grobergs and HOI never shared a
common idea or intention with regard to the purchase price of Lot 13. John Groberg
testified that he understood the purchase price of Lot 13 was to be $70,000. (Tr. at 44.)
Although Scott Lancelot testified all homes in the Madison subdivision were priced based
on the appraised value (Tr. at 288), John Groberg claimed that he had never seen the May
20, 1998 appraisal which came in at $138,000, and that he never agreed to this price. (Tr.
at 159-60.) Moreover, when asked by the Grobergs' counsel at trial whether he had ever
told the Grobergs that they would have to pay the appraised price of the house, Dick
Welch-who negotiated the REPC with the Grobergs-replied, "the answer is no, I didn't tell
them that." (Tr. at 326-27.) Because the record does not support the notion that there was
a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000, the trial court's decision that HOI did not breach its
contract with the Grobergs should be affirmed.
//
//
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m.

BECAUSE THE GROBERGS PROVIDED NO BENEFIT TO HOI.
THEY CANNOT RECOVER ON A CLAIM OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT

As an initial matter, it should be noted that a party who cannot foreclose a
mechanic's lien for failure to hold a contractor's license is also barred from recovering on
alternative, equitable theories. See A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen
Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Thus, if the Court agrees with
HOFs argument (see Part ID, supra) that the Grobergs cannot recover for their mechanic's
lien because they were unlicensed, it need not consider the arguments which follow.
Nevertheless, because HOI lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13, it is difficult to see how
HOI received a benefit from the Grobergs' labor or how they can be entitled to recover for
the unjust enrichment of HOI. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that it is
appropriate to grant trial courts broad discretion in applying law to fact in unjust
enrichment cases. For these reasons, the trial court's decision that the Grobergs were not
entitled to recover for unjust enrichment should be affirmed.
A.

The Grobergs Failed to Show That They Provided Any Benefit to
HOI

There are two branches of quantum meruit (also known as "implied contracts"):
contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). The elements of contracts implied in law (also known as "unjust
enrichment"), are: (1) the defendant has received a benefit; (2) the defendant appreciates
the benefit; and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
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without paying for it. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. In Davies, the court noted that the measure
of recovery for unjust enrichment "is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant
(the defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff... or necessarily the
reasonable value of plaintiff s services." Id at 269 (citing First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)).
Because HOI gained nothing from the Grobergs' labor, HOI was not unjustly
enriched by the Grobergs. Rather than showing that HOI received a benefit, the
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that HOI actually lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13.
(Compare sales price [Tr. at 282] with costs to HOI [Tr. at 287].) According to Defendant's
Exhibit 11, which was received without objection (Tr. at 21-23), HOI expended
$176,735.28 on Lot 13. (Tr. at 287.) However, HOI was only able to sell Lot 13 for
$149,000.00. (Tr. at 282.)
Under Davies, the detriment to the plaintiff does not determine his entitlement to
recovery. Rather, it is the benefit to the defendant that is relevant. HOI's counsel
established at trial that the Grobergs had provided little, if any benefit, to HOI through their
labor on Lot 13. He called Dee McRae, a realtor with 16 years experience who was
familiar with Lot 13, to render an opinion on its potential value. She testified that Lot 13
"had the custom features of a $180,000 house." (Tr. at 500.) In contrast, the neighboring
houses in the subdivision had an average value of $100,000. (Id.) She testified that, due to
a concept known as "regression," the installation of custom features on a house in that
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particular subdivision could have only a limited effect on the price of such a house. (Tr. at
501-502.) She testified that the full value of custom improvements installed in a house in
HOFs subdivision could not be realized in the sale of a home in that location, and that the
$149,000 sales price was "the best you could do

" (Tr. at 502.)

Because the Grobergs provided no benefit to HOI, the trial court's decision that the
Grobergs could not recover for unjust enrichment should be affirmed.
B.

The Grobergs' Reliance on Jeffs v. Stubbs Is Misplaced

The Grobergs rely on Jeffs v. Stubbs for the proposition that a plaintiff can prevail
on an unjust enrichment claim even if he has performed labor primarily for his own benefit.
However, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Jeffs, the
plaintiffs were religious adherents who had deeded their own land to a religious
organization, UEP. The plaintiffs understood that they could not thereafter sell or
mortgage the lots they had donated to UEP, and that they would forfeit any improvements
they had made to the lots if they abandoned them. See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1239. However,
UEP promised that the plaintiffs could live on the land "forever." See Id. at 1240. In spite
of this agreement, UEP later declared that all its adherents were merely tenants at will, and
evicted numerous adherents from the land after the group had split over doctrinal disputes.
See Id. In Jeffs, the third element of unjust enrichment was clearly fulfilled: it was
inequitable for the UEP to evict the plaintiffs, who had not only made improvements on
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their land, but also had donated land to the organization and relied upon a promise that they
could live there forever
In contrast, the Grobergs did not donate property to HOI. Unlike the plaintiffs in
Jeffs, who donated property to UEP and ended up with nothing, the Grobergs entered into
the REPC with full knowledge that if they did not purchase Lot 13, they would be entitled
to have their original house back and that the easements granted to HOI would stay in place.
They were permitted to return to their property, and no promises were broken. The case at
bar hardly bears a comparison with Jeffs.
C.

The Trial Court's Decision on the Unjust Enrichment Claim is
Entitled to Deference Due to the Trial Court's Ability to Observe
Non-Record Facts, and Due to the Complexity and Novelty of the
Facts Under Review

While the Grobergs correctly identify this issue as a mixed question of law and fact,
the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[u]njust enrichment law developed to remedy
injustice when other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible
and workable doctrine. Therefore, we afford broad discretion to the trial court in its
application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,
1245 (Utah 1998). Among the factors to be considered in favor of granting broad
discretion to the trial court in the application of law to fact are: (1) the level of factual
complexity; (2) the novelty of the factual situation; and (3) the trial judge's reliance on
non-record facts such as the demeanor of witnesses. See Id. at 1244.
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All three Jeffs factors tilt in favor of granting the trial court broad discretion in this
case. First, the transaction between the Grobergs and HOI involved numerous documents
and discussions that resulted in a lack of a clear understanding between the parties. Both
HOI and the Grobergs sustained losses as a result, and the trial court decided to let the
chips fall where they had landed. Second, the "house swapping" transaction that HOI and
the Grobergs arranged was unusual, and is not likely to serve as useful precedent for future
decisions. Finally, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses to determine their credibility.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD HOI
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES FOR PREVAILING ON THE
GROBERGS' BREACH OF CONTRACT AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLAIMS

Although the district court recognized that HOI was entitled to attorney fees as the
prevailing party on the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim, it improperly denied HOI's
request for attorney fees as the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach of contract and
unjust enrichment claims. (SeeR. at 347-48.) When a party is entitled to attorney fees by
contract or statute, and prevails on multiple claims involving a common core of facts and
related legal theories, he is entitled to all fees reasonably incurred in the litigation. See
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Kurth v.
Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113,1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Prevailing party status on one claim
will even subsume a failure to prevail on another when the claims are closely related. See
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Dejavue, 993 P.2d at 227 {citingDurant v. IndependentSch. Dist No. 17, 990 F.2d 560,
566 (10th Cir. 1993)).
The Grobergs' contract claim arose from the REPC, which provides that "the
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." See Groberg
(Appellant's Addendum) at 24. Nevertheless, the Grobergs argued (R. at 334-35), and the
trial court apparently agreed, that their breach of contract claim was not related to the
REPC because their Amended Complaint did not specifically allege a breach of the REPC.
(See R. at 48-49.) The Grobergs apparently believed that a distinct contract, unrelated to
the REPC, existed regarding the easements they granted to HOI. However, the district court
found that the REPC was an integrated agreement except for the price of Lot 13, and that
the entire consideration for the easements was contained in the REPC. (SeeR. at 321, ^| 8.)
Thus, the Grobergs' attempt to characterize their breach of contract claim as a claim
separate and distinct from the REPC fails, and HOI is entitled to all attorney fees
reasonably incurred in defending against that claim.
Further, HOI is entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending against the
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim because that claim, like their mechanic's lien claim,
arose from the theory that the Grobergs were entitled to compensation for the work they
provided on Lot 13. In Kurth v. Wiarda, the court affirmed an award of attorney fees to
Kurth, who successfully defended against Wiarda's mechanic's lien claim, although the
mechanic's lien claim itself had been dismissed by the time of trial and the bulk of Kurth's
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fees arose from prosecuting claims for which attorney fees are not ordinarily awarded.
The court held that "attorney's fees were properly awarded because a portion of these
otherwise non-compensable claims overlapped the mechanic's lien action on which the
Kurths prevailed." SeeKurth, 991 P.2d at 1116 . Because the Grobergs' mechanic's lien
claim and their unjust enrichment claim overlap, HOI was entitled to all fees reasonably
incurred in defending against their unjust enrichment claim. HOI therefore respectfully
requests that the Court remand the question of an appropriate attorney fee award to HOI as
the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, HOI respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals
affirm the trial court's conclusions that the Grobergs were not entitled to foreclose their
mechanic's lien, or to recover on their breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.
However, HOI invites the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of
HOI's request for attorney fees incurred in defending against the Grobergs' breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims. HOI was the prevailing party and should be entitled
to reasonable attorney fees under the REPC and under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
(providing attorney fees to prevailing party in action to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim).
Further, HOI respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals remand the issue of HOI's
entitlement to attorney fees for the determination of an appropriate award, including the
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal.
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Tab A

HOME REPAIR CONTRACT
THIS CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT, entered into this
1st day of April
1998,
between McClellan Constructi having an office for business at
3197 Patrick Drive
hereafter referred to as CONTRACTOR,
and Groberg, John A.
7395 West 3100 South

Groberq, Shauna
residing at
hereinafter referred to as OWNER,

WHEREAS, the Owner desires certain rehabilitation on the premises
owned by him (them) and known and numbered as 7395 W 3100 S, Magna 840
WHEREAS, the Contractor is a
the State of Utah; and

licensed

Contractor under

the laws of

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration the mutual promises and covenants
contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration,
the parties agree and contract as follows:
A. The Contractor agrees to furnish all labor, material, supervision
and services necessary to complete the work described on the work
description attached hereto and which is hereby incorporated by
reference.
B. The Owner agrees to pay to the Contractor the total sum of
$ 70,111.00
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement upon total completion of the contract and upon total
satisfaction of all other contractual terms by the Contractor.
C. This Contract is subject to the issuance of a proceed order by* the
Owner and no work shall be commenced by the Contractor until the
Contractor receives a written proceed order. If the Owner desires
to proceed with the contract, the Owner shall issue a proceed
order within 010
calender days from the date of acceptance of the
Contractor's bid and proposal. If the proceed order is not received
by the Contractor within this period, the Contractor has the option
of withdrawing his bid and proposal.
D. If the Owner does not issue a written proceed order, this agreement
shall be null and void and neither party shall be bound by any of
the terms hereof.
E. The Contractor shall commence within
receiving the proceed order.

10

calender days after

F. The Contractor shall satisfactorily complete the work within
120
calender days after issuance of the proceed order. Time is the
essence of the Agreement.

1

If performance by Contractor is prevented or delayed as a direct
result of riot, insurrection, fire or Acts of God, an extension of
one (1) working day in the time limit for completion of the work to
be done hereunder will be allowed the Contractor for each working
day lost from such cause, provided the Contractor, within three (3)
days after the beginning of such delay, gives written notice to the
Housing Rehabilitation Division of the delay and the reason or
reasons for it.
IF PRIOR TO OR WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE DATE of substantial
completion, or within such longer period of time as may be
prescribed by law or by the terms of any applicable special
guarantee required by the Contract Documents, any work is found to
be defective or not in accordance with the Contract Documents, the
Contractor shall correct it within (10) days after receipt of a
written notice from the Owner. The Owner shall give such notice
promptly after discovery of the condition. The Contractor shall
bear all costs of correcting any such defective work. This clause
shall survive the closing and payment under this contract.
In the event that it shall be necessary for the Contractor to
perform any corrective work, the Contractor shall bear the cost of
all such work, including work performed by subcontractors and
redoing work which was damaged or destroyed during the removal,
installation or correction of any work.
Subcontractors shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this
contract insofar as it applies to their work, but this shall not
relieve the General Contractor from the full responsibility to the
Owner for the proper completion of -all work to be executed under
this Agreement, and the General Contractor shall not be released
from this responsibility by a Sub-Contractual Agreement he may mak,e
with others. The terms of this Agreement shall be incorporated by
reference into all subcontract agreements. The Contractor shall
only
employ the subcontractors
listed on the "List of
Subcontractors and Suppliers" form. Any substitutions or additions
shall be given to the Housing Rehabilitation Division.
Repairs shall be made to any part of the Owner's home damaged
during construction, whether by the Contractor or by a
subcontractor.
This includes all surfaces, furnishings, or
equipment damaged. The Contractor shall make all such repairs at
no additional cost to the Owner.
Termination by the Contractor. If the work is stopped for a period
of thirty (3 0) days under an order of any court or other public
authority having jurisdiction, through no act or fault of the
Contractor or a subcontractor or their agents or employees or any
other persons performing any of the work under a contract with the
Contractor, or if the work should be stopped for a period of eight
(8) days by the Contractor because the Owner fails to issue payment
as provided in the Agreement, then the Contractor may, upon seven
(7) days written notice to the Owner with a copy to the housing
Rehabilitation Division terminate the Contract.
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The Contractor shall be deemed in default if the Contractor:
1.
Is adjudged bankrupt; or
2.
Makes a general assignment for the benefit of his creditor; or
3.
Becomes insolvent and receiver is appointed; or
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

He fails or refused (except in cases for which extension of
time is provided) to promptly commence work and diligently
continue with the work to completion; or
He fails to supply enough properly skilled workmen or proper
materials; or
He fails to make prompt payment to subcontractor or for
materials or labor; or
He permits liens to be filed against the Owner's property; or
He disregards or does not comply with all laws, ordinances,
rules, regulations or orders of any public authority having
jurisdiction; or
He fails to make steady progress in the work; or
He otherwise violates the Contract Documents.

In the event of a default by the Contractor, the Owner shall give
the Contractor seven (7) days written notice to perform the
necessary work or make the necessary corrections. In the event
that the Contractor fails to remedy the default within the seven
(7) day period, the Owner shall have the right to take possession
of the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, construction
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may
finish the work by whatever method he may deem expedient. In such
case the Contractor shall not be entitled to receive any further
payment until the work is finished. If the unpaid balance of the
Contract Sum exceeds the cost of finishing the work, the Contractor
shall receive the lesser of a) the reasonable value of work and
materials performed by the Contractor less damages caused by
Contractor's breach, poor workmanship or materials and other
backcharges; or b) the amount by which unpaid balance of the
contract sum exceeds the total cost of completion of the contract.
If the cost of finishing the work exceeds the unpaid contractual
balance, the Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner. The
costs incurred by the Owner must be reasonable.
Prior to being paid the Contract Price;
1.

2.
3.
4.

The Contractor shall assign all warranties with regard to any
equipmenr or supplies which the Contractor has installed in
the subject property. The Contractor shall also execute a
guarantee for a one (1) year period of time, in accordance
with Paragraph H of the Contract.
The Owner shall have certified, in writing, that insofar as
the Owner is aware, the work has been done satisfactorily and
the disbursement of funds may be made.
The Rehabilitation Division has made a final inspection and
has indicated that for its lending purposes the work-has been
satisfactorily completed.
The Contractor and Owner shall have executed a "Statement of
Completion," a copy of which is attached.
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A lien waiver must be executed and presented to the Owner by
the contractor.
Protection against liens and civil action.
Notice hereby
provided in accordance with Section 3 8-11-108 of the Utah Code
that under Utah law an "Owner" may be protected against liens
being maintained against an "owner-occupied residence" and
from other civil action being maintained to recover monies
owed for "qualified services" performed or provided by
suppliers and subcontractors as a part of this contract, if
and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
b.
c.

the Owner must enter into a written contract with either
an "original contractor" who is properly licensed or
exempt of licensure, or with a "real estate developer";
required building permits must have been obtained and;
the Owner must pay in full the original contractor or
real estate developer or their successors or assigns in
accordance with the written contract and any written or
oral amendments to the contract."

When progxess payments are to be made, the Contractor will
include a schedule which specified the stages at which
payments will be made and the percentage (or amount) or the
contract price which will be paid for the satisfactory
completion of each stage. Progress payments shall not exceed
eighty percent (80%) of the value of the work satisfactorily
completed. Progress payments (limited to two (2)) and final
payment due within twenty (20) days after the Owner, in care
of the Rehabilitation Division, receives the Contractor's
invoice and satisfactory release of lien for completion of
work or installed materials and acceptance of work by the
Owner.
The Contractor shall indemnify the Owner and the Housing
Rehabilitation Division from any and all claims by third
parties injured on or about the subject premises as a result
of any negligence of the Contractor, his subcontractors,
agents, employees, materialmen or laborers, and from all
claims by subcontractors, agents, employees, materialmen,
equipment suppliers, material suppliers or laborers for
nonpayment or any other claim arising out of this contract and
the work hereunder, including reasonable attorney's fees for
the defense of any such claim.
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The Contractor shall make no changes in the material used, or in
the specified manner of constructing and/or installing the
improvements; nor shall the Contractor supply additional labor,
services or materials beyond that actually required for the
execution of the Contract, unless authorized by the Owner and
approved by the Housing Rehabilitation Division in the form of a
written change order with proper signatures of all parties
involved. No claim for adjustment of the contract price will be
valid unless so ordered.
The Contractor shall be required to;
1.
Promptly pay all subcontractors, materialmen, laborers and
employees, and shall require all subcontractors to do
likewise, and shall keep the property free from all liens,
claims or judgments, and shall defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the Owner and the Housing Rehabilitation Division
from and against any and all such liens, claims or judgments
and from and against any and all suits, actions or proceedings
and of defending the same.
2.

Furnish evidence of comprehensive public liability insurance
coverage protecting the Owner for not less than $3 00,000.00 in
the event of bodily injury including death and $3 00,000.00 in
the event of property damage arising out of work performed by
the Contractor.

3.

Furnish evidence of insurance or other coverage as required by
the State of" Utah governing Workmen's Compensation.

4.

Obtain and pay for all permits and licenses necessary for the
completion and execution of the work and labor to be
performed.

5.

Perform all work in conformance with the Uniform Building Code
and all other building codes, ordinances, regulations and
requirements, or all applicable municipal or county
governments whether or not covered by the specifications and
drawings for the work.

6.

Abide by the following federal and local regulations (copies
may be obtained from the Housing Rehabilitation Office);
a.
Jb.
c.

Contractor
must comply with
the Copeland
Act
(AntiKickback
Act) of June 13, 1934,
(Title
18,
U.S.C.,
Section
874): Kickbacks
from public
works
employees.
Lead-base
paint regulations
24CFR, Part 35.
This Contract
is subject
to Section
3 of the Housing and
Community Development
Act of 1968, as amended, (Title 12
U.S.C. 170 U) : Opportunity
for training,
employment,
contracts
and trade with residents
and business
concerns
in the project
area.
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d.

e.

f.

When the sum of the Contract 'exceed $10,000.00; Federal
and local regulations pertaining
to Equal Opportunities
as set forth in the Terms and Conditions Form H.U.D.
6231, Section
8-a(17).
If the structure
contains eight
(8) or more dwelling
units
after rehabilitation;
Federal Labor Standards
Provisions
as set forth in Form H.U.D. 7322, Federal
Labor Standards
as modified
by Form H.U.D.3200A,
Amendment to Federal Labor Standards Provisions
For nonresidential
contract;
Federal Labor Standards
Provision as set forth in Form H.U.D. 3200, Federal Labor
Standards Provisions,
as modified by Form H.U.D. 3200B,
Amendment to Federal Labor Standards
Provisions.

Keep the premises clean, orderly and safe during the course of
the work and remove all debris from the premises at the
completion of the work. Materials and equipment which have
been removed and replaced as part of the work shall belong to
the Contractor, unless otherwise specified in the Work
Description.
Not assign this contract without the written consent of the
Owner and Housing Rehabilitation Division.
Guarantee all work performed against defects of material and
workmanship for a period of one (1) year from the date of
final acceptance of all work required by this Contract, unless
otherwise specified. This clause shall survive the completion
of the work hereunder and shall survive the closing and
termination of this contract.
Provide the Owner, in care of the Housing Rehabilitation
Division, with all manufacturers' and suppliers' written
guarantees and warranties covering materials and equipment
furnished under this contract.
Provide competent supervision at all times during the progress
of the work.
Agree that all work shall be done in a good workmanlike manner
in accordance with good trade practices, and using materials
as specified.
Permit the U.S. Government, or its designee to examine and
inspect the rehabilitation work.
Certify that he has made a physical, on-site inspection of the
subject property before submitting his bid and proposal.

6

15.
R.

Contractor shall provide all necessary sketches, plans or
drawings as required by the Building Inspection Department.

The Owner will;
1.

Permit the Contractor to use, at no cost, the existing
facilities such as heat, power and water, necessary to carry
out and complete the work.

2.

Cooperate with the Contractor to facilitate the performance of
the work. Neither the Owner nor any members of the Owner's
family or household will hinder the Contractor in his work.

3.

Neither permit nor make any substitutions, changes or
additions to the work description, contract, plans or
specifications without approval of the Housing
Rehabilitation Division; such written approval to be in the
form of a written change order.

4.

Will not change his (their) mind(s) once he (they) has (have)
chosen the color of paint or other materials and the
Contractor has ordered said materials.

5.

Allow the necessary removal and displacement of rugs,
furniture, appliances, etc. necessary to the performance of
the work.

6.

The Owner agrees to give the Contractor access to the real
property which is the subject of this action, and to the
interior thereon within ten (10) days of the execution of this
agreement.
The Owner understands that if the Contractor
cannot obtain access to the home within ten (10) days of this
Agreement, or
if the Contractor does not have continued access throughout
the duration of the Contract, the Contractor shall have the
right to give written notice of his termination of this
Agreement to both the Owner and the HOUSING AUTHORITY, and
shall at that time, be relieved of all liability to perform
this Contract.

7

S.

The premises are to be occupied unless specified in
during the course of the construction work.

writing

T.

Final Payment of the contract amount will be made only after
final inspection by the Housing Rehabilitation Division and
acceptance by the Owner of all work to be performed by the
Contractor, and when the Contractor has furnished the Owner, in
care of the Housing Rehabilitation Division, at 3595 S Main St.
Salt Lake City, Utah, with satisfactory release of lien or
claims for liens by the Contractor.
Final payment shall not
limit the Contractor's responsibility with respect to payment
of all sub-contractors, laborers, materialmen and for all
equipment and other parts of this Contract.

U.

The contract consists of the following:
1.
Rehabilitation Contract - pages 1 through 8.
2.
Description of Work, Bid and Specification
Pages 1 through 8.
3.
Plans N/A

V.

For the consideration named herein the Contractor proposed to
furnish all materials and to do all the work described in, and
in accordance with the contract identified above in item U. of
the General Condition for the lump sum price of $ 70,111.00

W.

Total Cost of Addendums, if required: $

.

Contractor and Owner hereby acknowledge acceptance of this agreement;

m^r

tti6r

.

"

jjai:e

tf

Ddt^T

^

7395 W 3100 S, Magna 840
Address of Property to be Rehabilitated
McClellan Constructi
Contractor - Firm Name

/^/V»t~\(
Date jf

3197 Patrick Drive
Address
Contractor Signature

Title
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:a:e:

C c o i e r CI, C^n6

ch:\ end ShAur.a Groberg
,c i 13", .v.ac::*cr» Subdivision
?RO?CS?vL

2ID

EXTERIOR
7fT^ '^
0

\-

y)0
^

-^f*

^/•v ; ^
-* ,

Replace all windows with AJT.SCO 760 white
vir.yl.
Include replacing
new sills on
interior. Frame iivi.nc room window ror proper
Install new bay window to replace slider door
in kitchen. Erar.e zer.ch in kitchen.
Replace front dcor with new 5'6" unit with
oval top and class light on si'de. r ^^ply € J- by

N

OUJ^C<^J

'D
C%~C~~ ^+s-~ I - t s t a l l weed
~*
*
Six feet high
subdivision.
>/

>c? Q <*i
q^
n
/
^ _
*~

P/ :.^>£^

f e n c e on sz»*vh p r o p e r t y
to r.atch existing style

line.
in

Excavate for:?, and ,cour cutout in -foundation
\fc\r extending"* ^uent ch^-se' f o r " t i r e x?la"ce^ih
b^Sfr.en.^
7orr. and pour concrete landings for perch
steps, sidewalks, en front, anp rear entrance.5-kp r i*
.n
- ' ^
'
~ " Excavate',
rorr.
afvc
pc.ir*\ b&ctLr^--^
w a l l s . ,I n s t a l l c s r . t e r \ s ' u e o o r t ' ' Wc.'J. 1^ a:-.. .. ;\H!T*'^-*r

ciiinc*

Install sewer cand water — m e s frorr. stuiD cut * '**
n
— ic ewe 11 inc.
Include cro~. ure '/cvlv,r- ^
t
<?.r.e
t off valve.

^ 6 ' /T '

John and Shauna Groberg
Lot 13, Madison Subdivision
Page 2
INTERIOR
Livir.c Room
LTQQI^

Remove

two

walls

drawing.
• »/
M / f a M

<7

in

entrance

/ v
j h i n

/

way.

See
/

,

p ^ ^

^-LC<C

•

(

*- T ?

j^y 2 JJL

Install new sheet rock to ceiling in living
room .5"
r / (
./
is
S
^
y /'
C/ 3.Y- Install hardwood floor in living room and hall
to bathrccm door. 'Q^

^

<

j- J

Include
> ; Yv^w -2 UL./<

) z J 5 . ^ Reconnect existing gas log. \y\ <_ <^j
C

/ 9- -P2*''"

•If. <* • -N

*•*• -?5

P

r

8.

Insrall

9.

Install new -crack light on ceiling with four
fixtures.

10

Install^reilmg light with fan in ceiling.

sczl over staxrway.

Install carpet and pad down
basement - /j3 */ O ^J ^ <-x—j
Kitchen
CO<

o
o

, -^TL,V—

to

*\-(y p

^

1.

Remove all kitchen cabinets.

2.

Install new cabinets, sink, taps, j «-t ^-^ yj ^
Install new refrigerator,
microwave.
( , .a
^.,.

1h^

stairway

*t J

/ yf 5 ±_

£by owner))

dish washer
, \

and D&A±*L~

I n s t a l l hardwood f l o o r in k i t c h e n / d i n ^ r . c i r e a .
Ins-all new insulated - steel
garage/kitchen. Automatic closer required<
2

i

3 °K

W ?

0

John and Shauna Groberg
Lot 12, Madison Subdivision
Page 3

C 6.

Install new light fixtures with fan injkitchen. ^ ^ " f
/ar.d dining area)(2). ^ ^ ^ ^ 5
by
OLS^'-^J

CWv

y-

Install G. F. I. in outlets in kitchen counter
area.

0 8

Install new heat register ^Ln dining area.

%

Paint wall, ceiling and trim in kitchen.
rrfeGhoft/cLi n \ n g - w a l -

10,
Main F l o o r B a t h r o o m
f
.
. (3V
PI 1.
VRenove existing vanity.

ft

o <-*^ ^ -C^—
Install new vanity

with f o m i c a too and/sink, taps and d.rain\
fc 2.
0 3

t

4.

10 5 .

Install G.r.I. in bath.
Install new vinyl floor, k y
T"hew nardware^t"

install new six panel colonial door, v ln?r-cJ(. u/p r

G) 6.

Install new shower head.

\'~

7.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

1

§SiW^»"

1 2
9?

T-

^ j^p)h/<Jl hy o <-<-/' »y > -^ /^*

io;/<^-

Ing^ll-T^-Tg 1 ^^?!^

^

^c^wc^

t^^i^^i^TTcT

Install new carpet o n f l o o r / 1W

<£# C^/ta

3.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.
of closets.

4.

Install 4'two-tube fixture in hall.

<L><—J

Include inside

Frame, fill in and
Reoair hole in roof.
Match existing shingles.
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John and Shauna Groberg
Lo- 13, Madison Subdivision
Page 4
Main Floor 3/~ 3ath

a.

Install

cabir^ts

i d e wi£h d o o r s

on

Install new vanity with sink, taps and drains.

3
^

5

Install new vinyl floor.

6

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

All

1'pper 3edrcons

\. /' ^

x

gtsJ "7 £*

IQ
!-*-_ Install new six panel colonial type doors and
^ -5U)
hardware.
sjQ

2.

Install nirror sliding doors on closet, brass o*~ ^ k ' / c

3.

Sheexxock
ceilings t^
Preo reXdvx'for ocrtnt
Paint ail walls, ceiling and trim, include
closets.

'3

O

5.

Install new carpet and pad in rooms.
closets.

£

6.

Install new ceiling fixtures where broken or

Include//o
N
— /

missing.
Baser.enr
£Q

1-T- Install window in all rooms to code.
Family Room

_p
if?.,

9

1.

Install
o
amt

2.^

Install fireplace
i-^g v r t t r

~3

0^3^

electrical, sheet rock.

^-^5

insert,
i^S^r^

fO

gas._li.ne,

Prep

for

and ca-s

_

John and Shauna Groberg
Lot 13, Madison Suhdi%rision
Page 5
0

3.

Install carpet and pad to floor.

pg

4.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

(TJ y

o uy *?

c

<— J

3aser.ert Kitchen
\ld<

.—
—

l.

Install wiring for range, refrigerator, G.F.I.
outlet over counter, light switches and room
cutlets to code.

O

2.

Install plumbing, drains, water lines
s i n k . 9- <*>? $ C « % n c -Ci, r £,4o*<*

1Q0
'
f\
A*

for
C?bvVc^c

3.**- Install kitchen base cabinets, countertop and
upper cabinets per drawing. # Install sink,
taps, shut off valves.
4.

Install vinyl, carpet and pad to floor p e r ^ ^
drawinq. Cvner to choose style and color.
V^V

7£

5.

Install double french doors to exterior door
wav.

fc—

6.

SLr^^e-nrr&s-s^-,—install loo1:;—&ft€b-i>liLilve:i.

*^;

7.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

OL^J^"^

/?}
J

1/2 Bathroom
t—

1.

/-* ) / 2 .
pi 3.
0

4.

Frame and sheetrock per drawing.
Install plunbing and drain lines,
Install toilet and vanity.
Install vinyl floor.

5<-<.P(t>ly

Owner to choose.

Install electrical system, lights,
cutlets and vent fan to exterior.
Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

5

\?\/

CJUJ^CKT-

|3»./ ^ u ; ^ c ^^ G..

John and Shauna Groberg
Lot 13, Madison Subdivision
Page 6
Furnace Rocrr.
p.

I.

Frame, sheetrock wails and ceiling.

2 . ^

Install 30% furnace, ducts, vents and^cold air
to cede. J*'KI c (u< crA_
6I:M^^ /
pAV
Install water heater, vents and water lines.
Install electric light and outlet. ^ -f/^or- cJlr?i*

^

'3-

^^-^^
\ <
v n r ) ^
IM^
'
^S

3.

^- 4.

Install louver doors on entrance.

Utility Rocf-

1.

Frame and sheetrock per drawing.

P j^

2.

Install water, drain, electric system, dryer
vents and lights. 9- -P/oe^ c/^^'n

G*

3.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

Lever Master 3edroom
p-

1.

Frame and sheetrock walls and ceiling.

<£~

2.

Install electrical light, plugs to code.

Ps

3.

Paint walls, ceiling and trim.

I °l *f

4.

Install entrance doers (2).

Main Bath - Lower
p

1.

jOL £T 2 -

O
PQ

3.
4.

Frame and
drawing.

sheetrock

ready

for

paint

per

Install water, drains,and electrical system to
code.
Include vent fan, G.F.I, outlets and
light fixtures.
Install cabinets, countertop, sink, jet tub,
vi toilet, and shower cer drawing./;, ,../,/ /
_
Paint wails, ceiling and trim.
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PROMISSORY NOTE

MADE

AND

ENTERED

INTO

AT SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH this

1st da\

of April, 1998.
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally promise(s) tc
pay THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE (hereinafter called "The
Housing Authority") the sum of:
Eighty Three Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and NO/100's DOLLARS
($ 83,770.00 ), and to pay interest on the unpaid principal balance at the rat
of Zero percent ( J21 ) per annum until paid in full. All principal and interes
shall be immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of the first of any c
the following:
1.

Any actual or attempted transfer, whether voluntary or involuntary,
including by operation of law, or upon the death of the undersigned'
of certain real property used to secure this note pursuant to a Trust
Deed/Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract of even date herewith,
signed by the undersigned (said real property is hereinafter referred
to as "secured property").

2.

Sale of the secured property.

3.

Any conveyance of the secured property.

4.

Transfer of assignment of any equity or interest of the undersigned in
the secured property.

5.

Payment shall be made on or before the

1st

day of

April ,

Said payment shall be made in lawful money of the United States of America
at the office of the Housing Authority of its assignee, or at such other place
as shall be designated by the Housing Authority of its assignee.
The undersigned reserves the right to repay at any time all or any part of
the principal amount of this note without the payment of penalty or premium.
If suit or legal action is instituted by The Housing Authority to recover
on this note, the undersigned agree(s) to pay all costs of such collection
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs of Court in the event that The
Housing Authority.is the prevailing party.
Demand, protest, and notice of demand and protest are hereby waived, and
the undersigned hereby waives, to the extent authorized by law, any and all
Homestead and other exemption rights which would otherwise apply to the debt
evidenced by this note.
This note is secured by Trust Deed of even date, duly filed for record
in the office of the County Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this note has been duly executed by the undersigned
as of the date first above written.
JotirCh.

Groberg

Shauna Groberg"
On the

1st day of April, 1998./ personally appeared before me

John A. Groberg and Shauna Groberg
the signer(s) of the foregoing Promissory Note, who duly acknowledged to me
that

he

executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires: November 18, 1999
.
AAA

_

1£

HOUSING AUTHORITY REHABILITATION AGREEMENT WITH OWNER
This agreement made and entered into on the
1st day of April
98, by and between the Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake (herein
ferred to as "Housing Authority11) , and
John A, Grobergand
auna Groberq(herein referred to as "Owner").
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority anticipates lending certain funds to the
ner for the purpose of certain home repairs; and
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority can provide said sums only in accordance
th various regulations governing its various governmental programs for the
nding of said funds; and
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority can lend said funds only if the work is
rformed in accordance with the applicable building codes and is performed
tisfactory to its own criteria; and
WHEREAS, the Owner understands and agrees that
Lationship is solely as lender;

the

Housing Authority's

NOW THEREFORE the parties agree as follows:
1.

The Owner will contract with the contractor solely for the
repairs as outlined and agreed to by the Housing Authority.

home

2.

The Owner recognizes - and understands that the Housing Authority
will not lend funds for any changes, trades, repairs or remodeling
other than those agreed to by the Housing Authority, Furthermore,
the parties understand that the. Housing Authority will not lend
funds for work outside the agreed upon scope of work of any sort
even if the new work or different work is agreed to by the
contractor as a "trade or exchange" on other work that was to be
performed pursuant to the scope of work.

3.

The parties understand and agree that the Housing Authority shall
not pay or release any funds to the Owner or Contractor unless the
work which is part of the scope of work has been completed to the
satisfaction of the Housing Authority and in accordance with all
municipal and county ordinances and in accordance with all other
regulations which govern the scope of work and quality and
condition of the work done pursuant to the governmental programs
supplying the funds to be lent to the Owner.

4.

The Owner does hereby agree to indemnify the Housing Authority,
and to save and hold the Housing Authority harmless, with regard
to all payments made by the Housing Authority pursuant to the
Owner's authorization or approval. Fuirther, the Owner agrees to
indemnify and save and hold harmless the Housing Authority with
regard to any non-payment of a Contractor by the Housing Authority,
if so authorized or approved by the Owner.

5.

The Housing Authority shall have no liability to the owner for any
breaches of contract by the Contractor nor in the event that the
Contractor shall fail to make any payment to any materialmen,
laborer, supplier, subcontractor, or any other person. The Owner
shall be solely responsible for any and all liens.

6.

The Owner understands and agrees that the Home Repair Contract and
this document is a binding legal agreement and that the Housing
Authority does not act as legal counsel for either party.
The
Owner understands and agrees that they can have this document and
the Home Repair Contract reviewed by- their own attorneys.

7.

The Owner understands and agrees that the Housing Authority is not
the Owner's agent but acts solely as lender of construction funds.
The Owner is responsible for issuing authority to the Housing
Authority with respect to disbursement of funds to the Contractor.
The Owner is responsible for having the Contractor obtain payment
and performance bonds if the Owner so desires.

8.

The parties agree that the Housing Authority acts solely as a
lender and that it inspects the property for the purposes of
fulfilling its duties to safeguard the governmental/programmatic
funds loaned to the Owner.

9.

The Housing Authority shall have no liability to any contractor,
materialmen, laborers, subcontractor or suppliers as a result of
any failure to pay such contractors, materialmen, laborers,
subcontractors or suppliers.

10.

The Owner agrees and under stands that the Housing Authority is not
responsible for any mistakes, delays or defects in workmanship by
the contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, laborers or materialmen
It is understood that the Housing Authority's inspection is for
its own purposes only and is not a guarantee or approval of the
work performed by the contractor, subcontractors, materialmen,
laborers or suppliers.

11.

The Owner agrees that if there is any difference in work between
the scope of work approved by the Housing Authority and that which
the Owner wants done, that money loaned by the Housing Authority
will be used to pay for that work only if the owner obtains the
prior written approval of the Housing Authority.

12.

The parries incorporate by reference the attached Scope of Service
Agreement.
DATED this

1st

day of April

sing Authority of the County of Salt Lake

1998.

i

i THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION
Best Practices Database
www.enterpnsefoundation.org

HOUSING

S
November 11, 1998

TRY IT - YOU'LL USE IT - YOU'LL SEE

Mr. John Groberg
7395 West 3100 South
Magna, UT

AUTHORITY
OF THE C0WTY Of SALT UKE
3 5 9 5 So. Main
Salt Lake City, U T 8 4 1 1 5
Phone (801) 284-4400
Fax (801) 284-4406

HAND DELIVERED
Dear John,
The rehabilitation of your new home at the Madison development seems to be more
contentious than I believe is necessary. I want to restate in writing the general terms and
conditions of our agreement to avoid any more problems or surprises as we get to the end
of the project. These items have been discussed with you on a number of occasions.
1. We have signed a contract to purchase your existing house for the appraised value of
$87,500.
2. You have agreed to purchase the home on lot 13 of the Madison subdivision for the
appraised price of $138,000.
3. You have hired a contractor to complete the rehabilitation work to your specifications
for $70,111. If there are extras to the contract that you request it will decrease the
final equity in your new home.
4. We met on Sept. 30 with Dick Welch before his retirement. There were two issues
that you raised which we agreed to pay for in consideration of the long time that it has
taken to complete this project and in consideration that the appraisal on your existing
home is more than 2 years old. These items were the installation of concrete for the
driveway back to the sewer cleanout and trees and some landscaping on the property.
These are the only two items that we will pay additional for and Dean has given you
the parameters of our work. Anything else must be in writing in the existing contract.

5. Financing of this property will be accomplished as follows:
a. At closing your house will be purchased by HOI for $87,500. We will each pay or
split customary closing costs. You have approximately $30,000 remaining on the
mortgage at the house. This will be paid off at closing as will any other records liens.
The balance of the proceeds from the sale of your house, approximately $57,000
(subject to verification of your mortgage balance and closing costs) will be applied to
the down payment on your new home on lot 13. You will not receive any cash at
closing from the sale of your home.
b. The applied proceeds of sale will be subtracted from the $138,000 sales price of your
new home, leaving a balance of about $81,000 for a mortgage to be issued by the
Housing Authority from our bank pool funds. This loan will currently be at 6.68
percent amortized over 20 years. If closing is after January 1, 1999 the rate may
change up or down. Your monthly mortgage payment on an $81,000 loan will be
approximately $612 per month plus about $110 per month for taxes and insurance
escrows for a total payment of $722 per month. If the mortgage amount increases
because the proceeds from your current house are less than $57,000 then the monthly
payment will increase.
c. The Housing Authority will record a second mortgage against your property for the
balance of the actual costs of completing the site work, rehabilitation and other
development costs. Thismortgage will be termed a soft second mortgage, in that you
will not have to pay monthly payments on this balance. It will accrue interest at the
rate of 3% per year and will be added on to the balance. At resale of your house this
second mortgage plus interest will be due and payable along with the first mortgage.
In the event that you live in the house for more than 20 years, the second mortgage
will begin to be retired beginning with the payment after the full payment of your first
mortgage. Payments will remain at the same amount and it will be paid monthly until
retired. The approximate amount of the second mortgage at this time is estimated to
be $40,000. This represents the costs that have been incurred by HOI for the
development of each of the 15 sites for acquisition, streets, curbs, sewer and water
and other development costs.
d. Consequently, at this point we can estimate that the total debt against your new
property will be about $121,000 ($81,000 first mortgage and $40,000 second
mortgage). If you incur more costs for the rehabilitation or ask for additional work
from your contractor that have to be paid this will increase the second mortgage cost
by that amount. Under this scenario you will have approximately $17,000 in equity
in the house ($138,000 purchase less recorded debt of $121,000). Any additional
costs that you authorize will reduce this $17,000 figure.

e. HOI has paid for or obligated all costs that we will sustain. Anything more that you
wish to do will reduce your equity and you need to be aware of that. You also are
being charged for your portion of the interest on construction loans until you are able
to close and secure the permanent mortgage. This amounts to only a couple of
hundred dollars per month but each month that the final completion and closing is
delayed you will incur these costs against your equity.
I hope that this fairly summarizes the agreements that were made at the beginning of the
project and restated throughout the development. It is important that you understand this
clearly.

Sincerely,

©crtL ot>^aibt
Scott Lancelot

z^iMk

October 47 1999
3595 South Main Street

Mr. Richard Tretheway
Attorney at Law
2018 Spring Oaks Dr.
Springville, UT 84663

salt Lake City, Utah 84ns
Phone (8ot)284-44oo
Fax (soi) 284-4406
TD0

< 80t ) 284 ' 4407

Re: John Groberg
Dear Mr. Tretheway,
In response to your letter of Sept. 20, 1999 I can only restate that Housing Opportunities,
Inc (HOI) made an agreement with Mr. Groberg in 1997 about the terms of the sale of his
existing home and his purchase of the newly remodeled home on lot 13 at the Madison
subdivision. We have operated under the assumption that these agreements are in effect
and we are not willing to change them, especially since Groberg has been solely
responsible for the costs of the rehabilitation of the house on lot 13. If he believes that it
is not worth the cost that has been expended he has only himself to blame.
In regard to his rehabilitation efforts Groberg has caused our property to be liened by
McClellan Construction for 512,980 for work authorized by him but not paid. The
Housing Authority, as owner of the property, has been served notice by McClellan. The
notice is attached. In order to protect our interests in the house we will pay the 512,980
to McClellan within 10 days to remove the lien and add this cost to the debt on the
property.
Groberg has two choices:
I. He may complete the contract as agreed by selling his existing house to the HOI for
587,500 and purchase the house on lot 13 for the appraised value or the amount of
indebtedness on the property, whichever is greater. The Housing Authority will
provide a mortgage from Bank Pool funds and Salt Lake County to cover these costs.
The exact payment will depend on the amount borrowed. Groberg has had complete
control of all expenditures for the rehabilitation of the house and is solely responsible
for the costs attached thereto. After payment of the lien to McClellan the total debt
will be about 5156,000. A detailed listing of our expenses totaling 5143,552.72 is
attached. Adding McCIellan's payment of 512,980 brings the current total to
SI 56,532.72.
2. He can terminate the deal and remain in his old house. We will take possession of the
house on lot 13 and sell it for appraised value to another buyer. Groberg will not
receive any reimbursement for any out of pocket costs that he might claim. We will
lo^e about 520,000 that he has overexpended on the house and he will lose any
amounts that he has put in above and beyond what has already been paid. (You will

note on our detail that Groberg has been reimbursed $15,763.32 for materials
purchased for the house).
These are the only two options available. We will not renegotiate the terms of the
original agreement that were well known to Groberg. He was warned on many occasions
about the effect of his unrestrained spending on the house. My letter of November 11,
1998 is attached.
Groberg has until October 31, 1999 to close on the existing contracts or we will terminate
the deal and take possession of the house and offer it for sale. In order to get closing
documents ready we must have his decision to proceed in writing by October 22, 1999.
If Groberg does not agree to proceed with the original contract by that date the Housing
Authority and HOI will take possession of the house on lot 13, demand all keys and
removal of any personal property belonging to Groberg and begin to market the house for
sale. We will not delay this any further. Groberg has been promising to complete work
and close the deal for nearly a year.
We can offer Groberg a mortgage from the bank pool for $113,000 at 5.68% interest
amortized over 20 years plus a second mortgage of $25,000 from the County at 3%
interest accrued but deferred until the first mortgage is paid. The additional costs on the
house of about $20,000 will have to be paid from the equity in Groberg's existing home.
If there is not $20,000 in equity remaining then the cost of the mortgage will have to be
increased.
The monthly payment on the $113,000 mortgage will be $788.85 plus an approximate
escrow payment for taxes and insurance of $110, bringing the estimated monthly
payment to $898.85. Amount and approval of the mortgage is subject to review by the
loan committee and an update of Groberg's income and credit report.
We reject the solutions advanced in your letter of September 20. Groberg wants to
change the terms of the agreements by raising the sale price on his existing home and
lowering the price on the house on lot 13. He also wants to be paid for labor and
materials. We have already advanced $15,763.32 in materials reimbursement to him. He
wishes us to pay labor for himself and his sons as well as your attorney's fee. These are
his costs not ours.
If Groberg terminates this deal we do not owe him anything for the easement. He signed
over this easement to us in the original contract whether or not the deal ultimately closed.
The mediation process does not affect this situation since all rehabilitation work and costs
have been controlled and authorized by Groberg. We will have the house reappraised for
resale to another buyer but the mortgage that Groberg must pay will have to include all
the debts against the property, most of which he incurred.
Please let us know your decision by October 22 or we will proceed as stated.

Sincerely,

Scott Lancelot

EXPENSES

Company

Item #

11

L

Date

Amount

Crown Home Improvement

02/06/98

$

541.00

Monroe (window well gravel)

04/20/98

$

10.00

Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste (landfill dump fee)

05/01/98

$

8.00

Colonial Building Supply

05/08/98

$

188.33

Robert Fackrell (installation of coaxial cable, phone
jacks & wiring)

06/18/98

$

1,000.00

McClellan Construction (garage storage room)

06/18/98

$

1,500.00

Marvin Heath (brick mason fireplace)

06/22/98

$

500.00

8.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

08/15/98

$

1.15

9.

Rocky Mountain Stove & Fireplace

09/09/98

$

855.89

10.

Home Depot (linseed oil for perimeter fences)

09/29/98

$

9.54

11.

Home Depot (carpentry supplies)

09/29/98

$

13.35

12.

Rocky Mountain Stove & Fireplace

10/08/98

$

284.92

13.

Colonial Building Supply

10/12/98

$

50.50

14.

Colonial Building Supply

10/12/98

$

63.75

15.

Sam's Club (2 lights)

10/28/98

$

39.98

16.

VI Propane (propane to heat house)

12/01/98

$

24.44

17.

Advance Architeccural Products (AAP) (wall bond)

12/02/98

$

26.06

18.

Advance Foam Plastics

12/03/98

$

137.19

19.

Tile Traditions

12/08/98

$

11.95

20.

Home Depot (electrical supplies) [see #44 credit]

12/29/98

$

214.19

21.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

12/29/98

$

32.82

I 22.

Flying J (propane to heat house)

01/02/99

$

20.56J

I 23.

Home Depot (smoke detectors, bath fixtures)
[see #45 credit]

01/05/99

$

I 3,
I4
I 5'
1I 67 '
I'

191.94

Item #

Company

Date

Amount

24.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

01/07/99

$

166.01

25.

Home Depot (gas log for fireplace)

01/08/99

$

53.15

26.

Home Depot (tile supplies)

01/11/99

$

25.93

1 27.

True Value Hardware (plumbing supplies)

01/11/99

$

12.74

| 28.

True Value Hardware (electrical supplies)

01/26/99

$

5.31

| 29.

Home Depot (tile supplies)

01/26/99

$

8.98

ho.

Tile Traditions

01/30/99

$

53.47

31.

Home Depot (drywall supplies)

02/08/99

$

25.35

32.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

02/08/99

$

80.53

33.

True Value Hardware (electrical supplies)

02/08/99

$

101.42 1

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

02/15/99

$

199.09 1

35.

Duct Pros (to clean upstairs furnace vents)

02/17/99

$

119.95 1

36.

Home Depot (drywall supplies)

02/22/99

$

92.45 1

37.

Robert Kusnier (installation gutters, doors, windows)

02/22/99

$

576.00 1

Tile Traditions

02/25/99

$

74.38 1

39.

Tile Traditions Return

02/26/99

$

-37.61 1

40.

True Value Hardware (electrical supplies)

02/26/99

$

6.76 1

41.

True Value Hardware (electrical supplies)

02/26/99

$

2.68 1

42.

True Value Hardware (joint compound)

02/26/99

$

11.54 1

43.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

03/03/99

$

257.66 1

44.

Home Depot (return) [see #20]

03/03/99

$

-74.02 1

45.

Home Depot (return) [see #23]

03/03/99

$

-83.78 1

46.

True Value Hardware (wood bit)

03/12/99

$

2.59 1

47.

Home Depot (electrical supplies) [see #54]

03/12/99

$

296.83 |

48.

Home Depot (plumbing supplies & window blinds)

03/13/99

$

226.02 J

49.

Home Depot (return)

03/13/99

$

-191.66 |

|34.

1 38.

Item #

Company

Date

Amount

| 50.

Home Depot (window blinds)

03/15/99

$

278.22

1 51.

Robert Kusnier (beam wrap patio, basement window
wrap)

03/20/99

$

240.00

[ 52.

M-One Specialist (plumbing materials)

04/18/99

$

8.36

1 53.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

04/09/99

$

154.79

541 55-

Home Depot (return) [see #47]

04/09/99

$

-133.58

1

Auto Zone (fireplace paint)

04/20/99

$

9.25

| 56.

Colonial Building Supply

04/20/99

$

77.34

57.

Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste (landfill dump fee)

04/20/99

$

5.00

58.

True Value Hardware (plumbing supplies)

04/20/99

$

18.40

59.

True Value Hardware (propane)

04/22/99

$

5.99

60.

Home Depot (electrical supplies)

04/29/99

$

32.46

61.

RTI Railroad Materials

04/30/99

$

57.43

62.

Home Depot (nuts & bolts for handrail)

05/02/99

$

9.43

63.

Home Depot (return)

05/06/99

$

-50.11

64.

Colonial Building Supply

05/24/99

$

79.08

Closet King (closets, cabinets, counters)

06/10/99

$

1,650.00

$

10,179.39

[65.

SECTION TOTAL:
66.

Utah Power & Light

02/25/99

$

12.56

67.

Utah Power & Light

03/25/99

$

16.11

68.

Utah Power & Light

04/25/99

$

7.69

69.

Utah Power & Light

05/26/99

$

7.06

70.

Utah Power & Light

06/24/99

$

7.22

71.

Utah Power & Light

07/23/99

$

7.29

72.

Utah Power & Light

08/23/99

$

17.28 1

73.

Magna Water Co.

03/25/99

$

11.10

74.

Magna Water Co.

04/25/99

$

45.44 J

Company

Item*

Date

Amount

75.

Magna Water Co.

05/25/99

$

22.20

76.

Magna Water Co.

06/25/99

$

111.59

77.

Magna Water Co.

07/25/99

$

22.20

78.

Magna Water Co.

08/25/99

$

22.94

| 79.

Magna Water Co.

09/25/00

$

22.94

| 79.

Questar

03/05/99

$

87.18

| 80.

Questar

04/01/99

$

69.24

1 81.

Questar

05/03/99

$

55.25

1 82.

Questar

06/02/99

$

39.05

1 83.

Questar

07/01/99

$

30.37

1 84.

12511.22

08/03/99

$

21.58

85.

Questar

09/01/99

$

27.93

86.

Questar

10/01/99

$

17.61

SECTION TOTAL:

$

681.83

GRAND TOTAL:

$

10,861.22

W \6000\6356\0002\kblT»bleGen wpd

Backup documentation for expenses
omitted
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Lot 13

L ol Escrow Costs
r~
HOI Dev

[

Name

Dale

rnilo Fee10-O33
07/31/1995
1
1 Associated 1 illo Co Purchase 10-022
06/30/ 1996
iLarGon & Malmquisl Review 10-020
06/30/1996
07/10/1906
I Ihomaon Appraisal 10-032
[Magna Water Han Check Fee 10 021
07/11/1996
[Lartort & Malmqulst Ravlow 10-020
I 09/04/1996
[Sail Lake County Dev Service 10 020
10723/1996
[Salt lake County Cnrj Street Siqn 1Q-37 ; 10/31/1996
p e k Welch Salary JF. 12*016/10*023
! 12/31/1996
jAdmtn Oienso J£ 0-024/10-023
06/30/1997
[Admin Expense JE 6 025/10*023
06/30/1997
ItegHlFxp^inae 10 034
06/30/1997
[Old Rftpublic Tide Co Title Search 10-033 07/17/1997
|saK I ake County Buiidma, Fees 10-021
08/20/1997
jLarcon & Malwquibt Review 10-020
08/26/1997
Larson A Malmqulst Review 1O-O20
08/26/1997
II arson & Maimqujct R a view 10*020
09/30/1997
I Larson & Malmquisl Review 10-020
09/30/1997
[Fred A Morton insurance
10/03/1997
[Well's Robert Moving
10/16/1997
[Gcnoral Numodeling 10-029
10/31/1997
[j-red A McrtonInsurance 10-039
10/31/1997
fe^t) Hiighes A Sons 10*037
11/07/1997
[Larson &_Mdjm_quis{ Review 10-020
11/07/1997
[Magna Water Sub fees 10-020
11/07/1997
[General Rfcrnodftllng 10 029
11/07/1997
[Larson & Malmquist Review 10-020
11/30/1997
ILarson & M^lmqubt Review 10-020
11/30/1997
[Old Republic 1 illo Co fiUu Search 10 033 11/30/1997
jwolla hargo l.o<»n Nov Int
11/30/1997
[Wells Tarfjo Loan Nov Fees
11/30/1997
[Joe Rhodes Consulting 10 031
12/31/1997
[Fred A Morton Insurance
12/31/1997
vV>(ls Cargo Loan Dec Int
12/31/1997
AQjnln_L^pc»njf;os. JE 12-023/10-023
12/31/1997
\i arson AJMrnquist Review
01/20/1908
H»*m HuflhflB A Sons 10*037
01/26/1998
r
Well". Targo Loan Jan Int 01 028
01/31/1998
uuh Power & I IQM 10 037
02/0471998
Wolk hargo Loan Mar Int 03-035
00/31/1998
Herm Hughes A Sons 10-037
04/22/1998
Magna Wator
i 05/11/1098
McCletlan Const^
05/20/96
McCloilan Const
05/31/98
Fr(^ A Morton Insunnce 10-029
06/20/1098
rred A Morion Insurance 10-029
06/20/1998
McClel/an C_orust_
, 06/30/9B
[Wuil* Construction AdvcrUso 10-027
07/22/1998
[insurance Settlement
08/30/1998
Wells Targo AppfcngFee
I 08/31/1998
McClellan Const
09/03/98 I
fedora!fcxpre$«>U) 036
09/09/19981
Heath rackroll
09/24/98
Norm I lughw* & Sons 10-037
09/30/19981
Snfl L ake County impact Fee
09/30/19981
Sign A-Rama Advening 10-027
09/30/1998
kovcp Construction
! 10/29/1998^
Credil Reports Jt= 10-016
10/30/19981
Udmw Satanes JE 10 024
i 10/30/1998
j
Admin Ln^>JH«n_JF 10 026
10/30/1998
Copies JE 10* 28
10/30/1998!
Admin P/R Taxes JE 10 030
10/30/1996
Tax Sattlemont 10-035"
10/30/1998
I Conserve A Wait
! 10/31/1998

Paoo 1

Amount

I

Costs

1 60
S
160 $
$ 3 340 00
$
43G 00
$
2000
$
50 00
1
436 00
$
534 38 $
$
go oo
I
6 67
$
207 15
S
420 74
$
1 91
13 01
$
13 01 $
$
13 33 $
13 33
666 86
S
668 86 S
$
30 00 $
30 00
S
23 00 S
23 00
$
176 07 $
176 07
36 95
$
36 95 S
$
284 07 $
284 07
1 500 00
$ 7,500 00 $
S 11,370 00
111 50
$
111,50 $
$ 3,633 33 ?
3,633 33
$
410 94 $
410 94
304 60
$
304 60 S
S 3,790 00 $ 3,790 00
23 50
$
23 50 $
$
10431 $
104.31
47 27
$
47.27 $
$
17 58
5
266 66
$
105 06
$
109 00 $
109 00
$
109 10
$
367 57
S
45 00 $
45 00
I
4 853 68 S 4 653 68
S
109 98
S
10O00 $
10000
$
11268
S 3,200 00 $
3 200 00"
I
3 500 00
$5 174 40
$8 772 00
346
$
3 46 $
$
26 40 $
26.40
$9 016 00
157 34
$
157 34 1 $
$ (5 965 09) S (5 965 09)
$
118 10,
$11000 00
$
0 49
53 158 02 |
$ 7 128 71 S 7 128 71 i
1,15100
$ 1,15100 $
27 38
S
27 38 $
548 53
$
548 53 $
$
10 92
$
851 94
S
47 25 "1
$
040 '
$
71 56
$
44 75
$
3 62 $
3 82

Pajd From
I HO) Admin I HOI Loan
I Costs I Costs I

~

100

I
I Home Funds

$
!$

$
$
$

3,340 00
436 00

37

20 00J

:£
V"
$
S

5000]
08 38
90 00
6 67

207 15
420 74
1 01

$ 6 000 00
$ 11 370 00

$
S

17.58
266 66
T

$

S

109.10

$

109.98

$

112 68

105 06

367.57

$ 3 500 00
$5,174 40
$8 772 00

$9 016 00

$

118 10"
$11000 00 |

$

0 49
$3 158 02

$
$
$
S
5

10 921
851 94
4725 I
0 40 j
71.56
- -• - j

$

44 75

a IU cwi

IUC i f OH ni nuuoinvi HuinuKin ou ur
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Lot 13

Lot Cscrow Cosls

I

Name

[nxpencm Ciedit Repoils
11 if st Security Qankcard
[Larson & juatmquM
[Plumberc Supply
Plumbers Supply
lumbers Supply
[Evelyn Tucdenham
[United Rentals
Unit>d Rentals
[fiefa Construction
bagta Hardware
Salt lake County P tax
D6fa Conb ruction
|o«fa Construction
McQeilan Const
Evelyn Tucdenham
Allocate Mtloaga Cxponsc 11-0JB
Allocate Copy Fxpense 11 040
Allocate Acmln Salaries 11 041
Allocate Lmp Benohts 11-039A
Allocate P/r Taxes 11 030B
ifivontory Usage 11-021
John & Shauna Groberg . Matenals
McClelUn Const
Expennn Cradli Reports
Rodash Expenses bold Loli> 12-095
Strictly Hardwood Corp
IWells Fargo Interest 12-037
[WGHS Fargo Loan Tees 12-038
Allocate Copy Expense 12 039
Allocate Emp Benefits 12 040
Allocate Admin Saterleb 12-042
Larson & Malmqulal
J arson & Malmnunt
Larson & Malmquist
Larion 4 Malmquist
Larson & Mdrnquitt
[Larson & Malmquist
Unvon & Maimquiwt
Allocate P/r Taxes 01 027
Allocate Admin Saiaria* 01-027
Allocate Mllaago Exponco 01 027
Allocate Fmp Ben 01 027
Allocate Copy txpenss 01-027
Rocljfifi Exponsos Sold Lota 01 045
John & Shauna Groberg - Matenais
Allocare Mileage 1 9*5
Wulls Fargo Loan Rev Oct Nov Dec 1 96
Wells Farrjo Interest 1-97
Federal Express
John & Shauna Groberg - Material*
John & Shauna Groberg . Materials
c lasic Cabinets
Robert Kusner
Now Age Plaslenng lnc
Newman Wood Systems
Allont* P/r Taxw* 2-91A
Allocate Admin Salaiicc 2 01B
(Allocate Mileago Expense 2-9IC
|Allocate Rcllromont 2-91D
(Allocate Emp Ben 2 91E
Allocate Copy Expense 2-91F
WHU Farqo Lo^n Intor^ftl 2-01G
Allocate CreditReports 2 92C

Pago 2

Date
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
10731/1GM
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
10/31/1998
11/18/1998
11/24/1998
11/24/1998
11/25/1998
11/25/1998
11/30/1998
11/30/1996
11/30/1998
11/30/1998
11/30/1998
11/30/199B
11/30/1998
11/30/1988
12/18/1998
12/18/1998
12/22/1998
12730/1098
12/31/1998
12/31/1998
12/31/1996
12/31/1998
12/31/1998
12/31/1998
01/15/1999
01/15/1999
01/15/1999
01/15/1999
01/15/1990
01/15/1999
01/15/1999
01/30/1999
01/30/1999
01/30/1909
01/30/1999
0V30/1999
01/30/1999
01/31/1999
01/11/1999
01/31/1999
01/31/1999
02/18/1999
02/16/1999
02/16/1999
02/24/1999
02/24/1999
02/24/1999
02/24/1909
02/26/1999
02/28/1999
02/28/1999
02/28/1999
02/28/1999
02/28/1999
02/28/1909
02/28/1999

HOIDev
Costs

Amount
S
S
S
$
S
$
$
S
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
%
$
$
$
$
$
$
*
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
5
$
$
$
$
$
1
$
$
I
$
5
$
$
$
S
$
S
S
5
$
S
$
$
$
S
$
$
$
S

0 58
18 93
33 35
4 50
2 11
(1 33)
1801
29 26
1 17
386 53
4 72
167 48
346 84
1 296 00
8,200 00
36 02
63 59
1 27
206 84
28 49
19 76
22612
261619
9,502 60
0 70
266 06
1 924 50
1414 35
15 43
0 30
4 28
460 39
27 51
2 50
2011
26 55
12 51
75 57
20 24
8 09
82 38
12 20
622
0 45
5466
4 077 51
7 72
(334 27)
365 94
0 48
306 00
1 924 50
3 467 83
576 00
2 300 00
325 00
20 64
216 51
(9 36)
2 09
10 37
0 93
(244 04)
018

$
$
$
S
$
$
$
$
S
$
$
%
$
%
$

5
$
?

$

HOI Admin
Costs
$

0 58

$
S
$
$
5

63 59
1 27
206 84
28 49
19 76

$
$

0 70
266 06

Paid Prom
HOI Loan
Cosls

18 93
33 35
4 59
211
(1 33)
18 01
29 28
1 17
386 53
4 72
167 46
346 84
1 296 00
8 200 00
36 02

225 12
2 616 19
9,502 60

1 924 50
5 1414 35
$
1543

S
S
$
$
f
$
I

$

$
S
$

0 30
4 26
460 39

$
S
$
$
5
$

8 09
82 38
12 20
6 22
045
5466

$

7 72

27 51
250
20 11
26 55
12 51
75 57
20 24

4 077 51
$ (334 27)
$ 365 94
$

$
S
$
$
$
S

0 46

306 00
1,924 50
3 467 83
576 00
2 300 00
325 00
$
20 b4
$ 216 51
1
(9 36)
S
2 09
%
10 37
$
0 93
$ (244 04)
5

0 16

~"
108

|

Home Fundb |

r, uq

Lot 13

Lot Escrow Costs
Paid From

I

Name

[Rectos* Expenses Unsold Lots 2-920
[Deroon Distributing Inc
[Stephen R. Voskefl
[John & Shauna Groberp - Malaria Is
[Richards Electrical
[John & Shauna Groberg - Materials
John & Shauna Grobprg - Matenals
[Allocate PiR taxes 3 45A
lAilocaie A<Jmin Salaries 3-45B
lAiiocnto Mileage 3-45C
[Allocate Emp Bon 3-45D
[Aliocato £np Ben 3-45E
[Allocate Ciplos 3-45F
[wolli Fare o Loan Interest 3 456
[John & Shauna Grobero, - Materials
lExperian Credit Reports
[AilocatoPiRTaxe5 4 54A
[Allocate Admin Salaries 4-54B
[Allocate Fmp Ben 4-54E
JAJFocalo Copies 4-54F
IVY^Hs Fargo Loan 4 54G
[Aliocato Credit Repoits 4-54H
[Allocate P, R Taxes 5 42A
[Allocate Admin Salanyfi 5-42B
[Allocate M^ajgeu 5-42C
[Aliocato Fmp Ben 5-42E
Allocate Copies 5-42F
[Wells Fargo Loan Int 5-42G
Voided ChecK 5 43A
Allocate P/K Taxai; G-105A
Allocate Admrn Salaries 6-105B
Allocate Mileage 6 105C
Aliocato tmp Ben (J-105E
Allocate Copies 6* 105F
Woils eargo Loan Int 6-1Q5G
Appraisal Piofosstonals
Lxperian CretM Reports
Allocate Admin PR taxos 7-47A
[AllociilQ Admin Salaries 7-47R
Allocate Admin Mjioaqo 7^7C
Allo^nta Admin .Medico! 7-47D
Allocate Admin Intercut 7-47G
Allocate Admin Credit Reports 7-47H
Allocate Admin Interest 7-49G
Allocate Admin PR faxes 8-40A
Allocate Admin Salaries 8 40D
Allocate Admin Mileage 8 49C
Aliocato Admin Mp.dical 8-49F.
Allocate Admin Copies 8-49F
Allocate Admin intend 8-49G
[Allocate Admin PR Taxes 042A
[Allocate Admin Salaries 9-42 B
Aiioc-iifl. Admin Mileage 9 42C
Allocate Admin Medical 9-42E
Allocate Admin Copies 9-42F
Allocate Admin Iniorusi 9-42G
McCtalUn Const
Art 1 louse uoslcm
Harm Hugh
Newspaper Agency Corp,
Allocate Admin PR faxes 10-37A
Allocate Admin Salaries 10-3713
Allocate Admin Mileage 10- 3 /C
AJlocalQ Admin Mqdtcat 10-37E

Pagti 3

i

Dale

02/28/1999
03703/1999
03/12/1999
03/25/1969
03/25/1999
03/26/1999
03/26/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
03/31/1999
04/06/1999
04/29/1999
04/30/1999
04/30/1099
04/30/1999
04/30/1999
04/30/1999
04/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/30/1999
05/31/1999
06/30/1999
06730/1999
06/30/1999
06/30/1999
06/30/1999
08/30/1999
07/15/1999
07/15/1899
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
07/31/1999
i 08/31/1999
08/31/1999
08/31/1999
08/31/1999
08/31/1999
08/31/1999
09/30/1999
09/30/1999
09/30/1999
09/30/1999
09/30/1999
09/30/1999
10/07/1999
10/28/1999
10/28/1999
10/2B/199Q
10/31/1999
10/31/1999
10/31/1999
10/31/1999

Amount
S
0.24
S 3.584 82
$ 7,318 00
$ 3,621,06
$ 1.300 00
5
888 00
$ 2.022 58
$
13 96
$
144.35
$
3049
$
7.55
$
7 62
$
1.97
$
709.20
$
307.48
$
0,58
S
17 87
$
186.96
$
7 14
$
0.64
$
312 50
$
0.49
$
15.53
$
178.82
$
8.06
$
5 67
$
0.12
$
243 01
$
(500 00)
S
23.33
$
245 64
$
1615
$
11.85
S
0 83
$
243 01
5
225.00
S
0.12
$
11.71
%
125 56
I
13.92
$
5 43
S
69.48
$
0.07
S
(138 96)
$
8.07
S
81.45
S
11.19
S
7.01
$
0.83
$
280 01
$
12 10
$
128.10
5
6 54
$
3.85
$
234
$
161.80
S 12.980 00
$
26.12
$
487.50
5
34.67
$
1811
$
191 99
$
12.18
5
10,67

i
[

HQ! Oev.
Costs

S
$
S
$
$
$

$

HOI Admin
Costs
$

0 24

S
S
$
$
$
$

13.96
144.35
30.49
7.55
7 62
1.97

HOI Loan
Costs

3,584.82
1,316.00
3 62106
1.300.00
888 00
2.022.58

$

709 20

S

312.50

307.48
$
$
$
S
$

0.58
17 87
186.96
7.14
0,64

$
$
$
$
$
5

0.49
16 58
178.82
8.06
5.67
0.12
$""24301"

S

(500 00)
$
$
$
$
$

23.33
24564
16.15
1185
0.83
$

$

243 01

225.00
$
S
$
$
$

0.12
11.71
125,56"
13.92
5 43
$

S

0.07

$
$
5
$
S

8 07
81 43
11.19
7,01
0 83

$
5
$
3
$

12.10
128.10
6.54
3.85
2.34

69.48"

$ (138.96)

$ 12.980.00
S
28.12
$
487,50 i
$
34.67
$
$
$
3

18.11 i
191.99
12.18
10.67 I

S

280 01

$

161.80

I
108

Home Funds

THA NU. dUl^d444Ub

P, Ub

Lot 13

Lot Cscrow Costs

I

N&me

Allocate Admin Copies 10-37P
Allocate Admin Interest 10-37G
Allocate Madison Supples 10-37H
Salt Lake County P-tax
J Allocate Admtn PRTaxafi 11-2BA
(Allocate Admin Salaries 1-23B
[Allocate A<imm Nfieaflo 11-20C
1 Allocate Admin Medical 11-28E
IAllocate Admin Copies 11-28F
[Allocate Admin Inleresi 11-2BQ
[Magna Walor
Utah Power & Liont
Kevco Construction
[Maflna Water
[QueMar Gas
Scalley & Rendinn. PC
Utah Power & Llnhl
pKcate Admin P3 Taxes 12-25/,
Allocate Admin Salaries 12-25B
Allocate Admin Mileage 12-25C
Allocate Admin Medical 12-25H
Allocate Admin Copied 12-25F
AHocale Admtn Interest 12-25G
IpuesMr Gas
[blftne Walker Interest
Commission
ICIosmq Coats
Magna Water
uuh Power & U«hi
Allocate Admin PR Taxes 1-36A
Allocate Admin Salories 1-36B
[Allocate Admin Medical 1-36E
Allocate Admin Capias 1-361"
Allocate> Admin Interest 1-36G
QuesUrGas
Strike force Construction
Christina Sweet
Utah I'oworA Light
Allocate Admin PR Taxos 2-25A
Allocate Admin Salaries 2-25B
Allocate Admin M»tea<?a 2-25C
Allocate Admtn Medical 2-25E
Aiioc'atb Admin Copies 2-25F
Allocate Admin Interest 2-25G
Magna w**ter
StrikeForce Construction
Allocate Admin PR Taxes 3-41A
Allocate Admin Smarms 3-41D
Allocate Admin Mileage 3-41C
Allocate Admm Medical 3-41E
I Allocate Admin CopTes 3-41F
I ToI«il Fxponsne
IG/L Balance
I Variance

Pa$e4

Date

[

10/31/1999
10/31/1999
10/31/1999
11/00/1999
11/30/1999
11/30/1999
11/30/1999
11/30/1999
11/30/1999
11/30/1999
12/09/1999
12/09/1999
12/30/1999
12/30/1999
12/30/1999
12/30/1999
12/30/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1999
12/31/1QOQ
12/31/1999
01/20/2000
01/25/2000
01/25/2000
01/25/200Q
01/2672000
01/28/2000
01/31/2000
01/31/2000
01/31/2000
01/31/2000
01/31/2000
02/03/2000
02/03/2000
02/03/2000
02/10/2000
02/29/2000
02/20/2000
02/29/2000
02/29/2000
02/29/2000
02/29/2000
03/09/2000
03/31/2000
03/31/2000
03/31/2000
03/31/2000
03/31/2000
03/31/2QQQ

Amount
$
$
$
$
$
$
S
$
%
5
$
S
S
5
S
$
$
$
S
5
S
$
S
55
$
$
$
$
$
$
%
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
S
$
$
$
$
S
$
$
$
%
$
S
5

1,71
472 64
5 64
900 07 $
22 63
238 32
16 86
1167
0 78
243 43
22 94 $
12 32 $
1,125 00 ! $
22 94 $
55 67 S
123 75
14 52 $
8 31
89 86
20.43
3.09
0 23
467.54
11578 $
496 08
9,135 00 $
1,212 65 %
23 87 $
17 21 5
10.72
115 00
6 33
0 28
(233 77)
66.19 $
1,378.00 S
350.00 $
2 74 %
6.15
68 02
12.71
3 29 ,
0.08
355.44
44 40 $
1,345 00 $
8 05
92.92
17 69
6 21
2.23

$176 735 28
$176.735 28
1

HOlDev.
Costs

$

HOI Admin!
Costs
$

1.71

$

5 84

$
S
S
$
$

22.63
238.32
16.66
1167
0.78

Paid From
HOI Loan
Costs

$

472 64

$

243.43

$

467.54

$

496.08

I
108

Home Funds

990.07

22 94
12.32
1,125 00
22.94
55 67
$

123 75

5
S
$
$
$

8 31
89 86
20.43
3 09
0 23

14.52

115.78
9,135 00
1.212.65
23.87
17.21
3
$
S
$

10 72
115.00
6 33
0.28
$ (233.77)

66.19
1378.00
350.00
2.74
$
$
5
$
S
$

615
68 02
12 71
3 29
0.08
355 44

$
$
*
S
$

B.05
92 92
17.69
6.21
2.23

44 40
1,345.00

$ 103,004 02

$ 6,272 50

$ 5 277.48

* 40.620.42

• Additional Shown By County

•

$ 21.560 86
$
7.22

